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2020 Supreme(Ker) 178

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
P.SOMARAJAN, J.
T.M.Shafi, S/o. Mohammed - Appellant
Versus
G.L.Khaderkunhi S/o. Mohammed and Ors - Respondent
RSA.No.711 OF 2008(B), 1238 OF 2011
Decided On : 26-02-2020

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Sri.Kodoth Sreedharan
For the Respondent: Sri.V.V.Asokan, Smt.S.Amina, Sri.M.T.Madhavanunni, Sri.V.A.Satheesh

IMPORTANT POINTS
Regarding the genuineness of the agreement, the first appellate court applied Section 73 of the Evidence Act ignoring the expert opinion adduced under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. It is impermissible to reject the expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act by a comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act.

Headnote:

Transfer of Property Act –Section 52;; The Evidence Act- Section 45 --The liability of a pendente lite transferee, who is bound by the decree under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, though there is no privity of contract. It cannot be extended to a person who had obtained possession of property under a document of transfer prior to the institution of the suit, wherein the question of privity of contract or the liability under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would not come into play- But a suit for specific performance of contract for sale should be understood as the one seeking performance of contract inclusive of possession of property which is the subject of contract for sale-A separate relief of possession need not be incorporated when the person who had obtained possession either based on a deed of transfer or otherwise made as a party to the suit.

Statement of facts:

A suit for specific performance of contract for sale was decreed in part by the trial court directing return of advance amount in O.S.No.153/1996 (R.S.A.No.1238/2011). The first appellate court set aside the said decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that Ext.A1 agreement was executed against public policy. The other suit, O.S.No.152/1996 (R.S.A.No.711/2008) was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal, the suit was decreed allowing specific performance.

• Whether a comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act will prevail over an opinion given under Section 45 of the Evidence Act.

Finding of the court:

The decree and judgment of both the courts below in O.S.No.152/1996 will stand set aside allowing a decree of recovery of advance amount of Rs.9750/-with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of suit till the date of realization from the 1st defendant. R.S.A.No.1238/2011 is allowed in part accordingly. The decree of the first appellate court dismissing the suit in O.S.No.153/1996 is hereby set aside granting a decree of return of advance amount of Rs.11,750/-with 6% interest from the date of suit till the date of realization from the 1st defendant.

Result: Appeals are allowed

JUDGMENT :

1. A suit for specific performance of contract for sale was decreed in part by the trial court directing return of advance amount in O.S.No.153/1996 (R.S.A.No.1238/2011). The first appellate court set aside the said decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that Ext.A1 agreement was executed against public policy. The other suit, O.S.No.152/1996 (R.S.A.No.711/2008) was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal, the suit was decreed allowing specific performance.

2. Whether a comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act will prevail over an opinion given under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is the question that came up for consideration.

3. Some striking similarities were noticed by this court in these two appeals though they arise from two different suits and its decree and judgment. Hence it is felt prudent to have a common judgment in the matter.

4. The subject of both the suits are immoveable properties which come to 40 cents and 37 cents respectively, given to two landless persons. The plaintiff and the 2nd defendant in both the suits are the same persons. The dispute arose at the time of purchase of property by the 2nd defendant from the landless persons, the respective first defendant.

5. In both the suits, a sale agreement in anticipation was created between the plaintiff and the respective landless person, the first defendant in both the suits just after the issuance of pattayam obtained under the guise of a landless person. There is a clause in the pattayam preventing alienation for a period of three years. To circumvent the said clause, the period of contract for sale was agreed and fixed just after the expiry of three years ignoring the fact that it was a property given to a landless person. Yet another striking aspect was also noticed by this court that the balance sale consideration to be paid is only Rs.250/-in both the cases. There is no evidence to reflect the payment of part sale consideration in advance except what has been stated in the agreement. By the creation of the said agreement, the plaintiff effectively manipulated a device to take away the property given to a landless person just on completion of three years from the date of assignment at the risk of payment of Rs.250/-in both the suits. This would certainly engender a reasonable doubt as to the genuineness of creation of an agreement for sale of property in anticipation, that too, close on the heels of issuance of pattayam to a landless person. It is a clear indication regarding the fraudulent device resorted to by the plaintiff to snatch the property given to a landless person at the risk of payment of Rs.250/-in both the cases. The circumstance under which the pattayam was issued reducing the earlier period of seven years into three years becomes seminal at this juncture. If it is actually intended for the benefit of landless person, necessarily, there should be adequate measure to preserve the same as the property of landless person. But, instead of incorporating adequate measures, a relaxation is seen given to sell the property to strangers just on completion of 36 months ( 3 years). In the instant case, the plaintiff obtained an agreement for sale immediately after the assignment of the property to the landless person for purchasing the same on expiry of 36 months ( 3 years), the period of prohibition against alienation. This would show that the crafty curtailment of period of seven years into three years had facilitated the land mafias to achieve their goal under the guise of a landless person and to snatch the property of state government under that pretext. The minimum period required for safeguarding the property given to a landless person which was earlier fixed as seven years was arbitrarily reduced to three years i.e. just 36 months facilitating this kind of skulduggery in the hands of land mafia. The striking similarity involved in these two cases would certainly show that it is not an exception, but an indication of large

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