Point of Law: S.66A gives due authority/power to the Registrar to give such directions. The Section empowers the Registrar to give general directions for furtherance of the purposes of the Act.

ORDER :

C.S. Sudha, J.

Writ Petition No.36425/2017 was filed by the appellant herein seeking a writ of mandamus to be issued directing respondents 1 to 4 to release the amounts in the fixed deposits made by him. The learned Single Judge relying on the Division Bench decision in Meenachil Rubber Marketing & Processing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Choondachery Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2018(2) KHC 180 held that a writ as sought for could not be granted as equally efficacious remedy under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (the Act) is available and hence dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed Writ Appeal No.1693/2018. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench, the attention of the Bench was drawn to the order dated 13.08.2018 of another Division Bench in W.A.Nos.128/2018, 137/2018, 143/2018 and 144/2018 wherein Meenachil (supra) was considered and departed from on the basis of an order issued by the Registrar under Section 66A of the Act. The Division Bench in the present writ appeal held that the subsequent Division Bench decision in the aforesaid writ appeals dated 13.08.2018 is in conflict with the decision in Meenachil (supra) and hence directed the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Thus, the present reference order.

2. The point that we are called upon to answer is the scope of the power of the Registrar under Section 66A and whether the Registrar under the said Section has the power or jurisdiction to pass orders in contractual matters or in individual cases, like, directing the Society to release the fixed deposit amounts on maturity.

3. Meenachil (supra) was a case in which a Service Co-operative Bank Limited deposited amounts in a Co-operative Society for a fixed period. When the period was over, the amount was not repaid. A writ petition was filed for issuing a direction to the Society to pay the amount covered by the fixed deposit receipt to the petitioner Bank with future interest. Though the Society admitted the liability to pay the amount to the Bank, it contended that no writ petition is maintainable against a Cooperative Society. A Single Bench of this Court directed the Society to repay the amount with interest. In the writ appeal filed by the Society, this Court held that the writ petition did not satisfy any of the conditions for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner had no case that the grievance fell within any of the well-defined exceptions. There was no case that the Society had violated any statutory provisions or that they had not acted in accordance with the provisions of the Statute or that they had acted in total violation of the principles of natural justice. The writ petitioner did not also have a case that the remedies provided under the Act were entirely ill-suited to redress their grievances. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition cannot be entertained ignoring the statutory remedies available to the aggrieved person. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not absolute, but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. It is the normal rule that if alternative statutory remedies are available, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained. But there are exceptions to this rule, like, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question or where the statutory authority acts in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or when it acts in total violation of the principles of natural justice or where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations. Further, the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. Hence in view of the ef