The High Court cannot intervene under Article 226 when an alternative statutory remedy exists, particularly in debt recovery cases under SARFAESI Act.

JUDGMENT :

Muralee Krishna, J.

This intra-court appeal is filed under Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, by respondents 2 and 3 in O.P. (DRT) No.180 of 2025 challenging the judgment dated 26.06.2025, whereby the original petition filed by the 1^st respondent herein/petitioner was disposed of by the learned Single Judge with the following directions:

“3. After hearing both sides, I am inclined to grant three weeks to produce such materials on behalf of the petitioner so as to enable the Tribunal to consider the stay petition afresh, in particular the contention noticed above, based on which the Tribunal will take a fresh decision, in accordance with law, within three weeks thereafter. Till orders are passed as directed above, the coercive steps against the petitioner will stand deferred.”

2. The 1^st respondent-petitioner filed the original petition through her next friend, stating that the 1^st respondent has been mentally disabled since birth. According to the 1^st respondent, her father died intestate. By Annexure A3 partition deed bearing No.2932 of 1988 of S.R.O. Puthencruz dated 19.08.1988, the immovable properties belonging to the father of the 1^st respondent were partitioned between his three children, including the 1^st respondent. But, the signatories to Annexure A3 partition deed are the 1^st respondent’s brothers and her mother. The mother of the 1^st respondent signed that document on behalf of the 1^st respondent as her guardian. As per Annexure A3 partition deed, the ‘A’ schedule property having an extent of 20.24 Ares in different survey numbers was allotted to the share of the 1^st respondent’s brother Pappachan, wherein life interest was reserved to the 1^st respondent, permitting her to reside in the house situated therein during her lifetime. The ‘B’ schedule property in the partition deed was allotted to the 1^st respondent’s another brother John. The ‘C’ schedule property having an extent of 20.24 Ares in different survey numbers, was allotted to the share of the 1^st respondent. Though the mother of the 1^st respondent signed in Annexure A3 partition deed on behalf of the 1^st respondent, she has not obtained permission from the Court of law to effect the transfer of immovable properties of the 1^st respondent. Later, the brother of the 1^st respondent, namely Pappachan and mother Sara, executed Annexure A4 Power of Attorney dated 21.02.1988 in favour of Chinamma, authorising the Power of Attorney holder to sell the ‘A’ schedule property to one Basil N. Paul, the 3^rd respondent herein. On the strength of Annexure A4 Power of Attorney, Chinamma executed Annexure A5 sale deed No. 820/1998 of SRO, Puthencruz dated 24.02.1998 in favour of the 3^rd respondent, parting the ‘A’ schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed, including the life interest of the 1^st respondent. Subsequently, some other conveyances were also effected in respect of the property, and finally, the entire ‘A’ schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed was re-conveyed in the name of the 3^rd respondent. It was later understood that the ‘C’ Schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed, which was allotted to the share of the 1^st respondent was also parted with by her relatives without obtaining the permission of the Court. Annexure A3 partition deed itself is a void document since it was executed without obtaining necessary permission from the authority concerned appointed under the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation, and Multiple Disabilities