An appellate court may not reverse a trial court's acquittal unless the trial court's findings are perverse, illegal, or grossly unjust, particularly when the evidence does not unequivocally prove guilt.

JUDGMENT :

JOBIN SEBASTIAN, J.

This appeal has been preferred by the complainant in C.C.No.709 of 1997 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Neyyattinkara, challenging the judgment of acquittal rendered in the said case, dated 13.12.2002, alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N.I. Act”). For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties in this appeal are hereinafter referred to as the complainant and the accused.

2. The case of the complainant in brief is as follows;

The accused, in discharge of a liability of Rs.3,00,000/-, issued a cheque dated 03.04.1997 drawn on Federal Bank Ltd. Nagarcoil branch, in favour of the complainant. However, when the complainant sent the said cheque for collection through his account maintained at Federal Bank Ltd., Nagarcoil branch, the same was returned unpaid, stating the reason ‘funds insufficient’. Thereafter, the complainant issued a notice to the accused intimating the dishonour of the cheque and demanding the payment of the cheque amount. However, the accused refused to receive the said notice and did not pay any amount. Thus, the accused is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (for short “N.I. Act”).

3. Before the trial court, the complainant got himself examined as PW1 AND marked Exts. P1 to P6. Another witness was examined from the side of the complainant as PW2. On the side of the defence three witnesses were examined as DW1 to DW3 and two documents were marked as exhibits D1 and D2. Among the defence witnesses, DW3 is none other than the accused himself. After considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, and hearing both sides, the trial court found the accused not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act, and accordingly acquitted him. Assailing the said finding and the order of acquittal, the complainant has preferred this appeal.

4. I heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial court acquitted the accused in a hasty and unjustified manner without properly appreciating the facts and evidence brought on record. According to the counsel, as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque was duly proved, the trial court ought to have found that the complainant had succeeded in establishing the basic facts to draw a presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. The learned counsel urged that since the accused miserably failed to rebut the said statutory presumption, he is liable to be found guilty and convicted. In response, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused submitted that the complainant miserably failed to prove his case. According to the counsel, the complainant failed to discharge his initial burden to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque, and hence the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act cannot be invoked in his favour. According to the learned counsel, the trial court correctly appreciated the facts and evidence brought on record and rightly acquitted the accused.

6. Before delving into a discussion regarding the scope of interference in the present appeal, it is pertinent to note that the legal yardsticks applicable to an appeal against acquittal are different from those applicable to an appeal against conviction. Ordinarily, an appellate court would not interfere with a judgment of acquittal unless it is demonstrated that the trial court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust, and that the only possible conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record was that