The court ruled that the rejection of an organ donation application based on suspected financial exploitation without adequate evidence is arbitrary, emphasizing that altruistic intent must be evaluated without bias against socioeconomic status.

JUDGMENT :

C.S. DIAS, J.

1. “Hope is the heartbeat of the patient's spirit, a whisper that reminds him that even in waiting, he is one step closer to a new beginning.”

― Anonymous.

2. It is said that tragedy strikes in threes; the saying happens to be true in the poignant life of Uvais Muhammed, a 20-year-old boy suffering from chronic kidney disease who is precariously clinging on to life and anxiously expecting a renal transplant. The illness runs in his family, having claimed the health of his father, who now has a renewed lease of life with the kidney of his wife. In an act of altruism, Chippy, who has lost her younger brother due to renal failure, has offered to sacrifice her kidney to Uvais. Yet, the statutory authorities have denied permission thrice, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the donation by harbouring a suspicion of trade. Burdened with the constant fears of death, anxiety and desperation but with a glimmer of hope, Uvais is once again before this Court with the expectation of a new beginning.

3. Uvais, the 1st petitioner, has been advised to undergo a renal transplant, but he has no near relative to donate him a kidney. But, Chippy, the 2^nd petitioner, who is an employee of the 1^st petitioner's relative, has volunteered. Due to the statutory prohibition under Section 9 (3) of the TRANSPLANTATION OF HUMAN ORGAN AND TISSUES ACT , 1994, the petitioners approached the 2^nd respondent to forward their joint application for approval. However, their request was declined because they wanted a certificate of altruism from the District Police Chief. This Court, by Ext.P13 interim order in W.P(C) No.18513/2024, directed the Hospital to forward the joint application without insisting on the certificate. Nonetheless, by Ext.P14 order, the 3^rd respondent rejected the application for no valid reason, and by Ext.P15 order, the 2^nd respondent confirmed the order in appeal. By Ext.P16 judgment, this Court set aside the order and remitted the matter to the 2^nd respondent for fresh consideration. However, the 2^nd respondent once more rejected the petitioners' application by Ext.P17 order. Yet again, the petitioners assailed Exts.P14 and P17 orders before this Court. This Court suo motu impleaded the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy. S.P) and directed him to conduct an enquiry and submit a report regarding the relationship and the nature of the transaction between the petitioners. Along with Ext.P19 report, the Dy. S.P produced the statement of the 2nd petitioner, who reiterated that the donation is voluntary. In the light of Ext.P19 report, this Court set aside Exts.P14 and P17 orders by Ext.P20 judgment and remitted the matter to the 3^rd respondent for fresh consideration. Yet, by Ext.P21 order, the 3^rd respondent rejected the application. Ext.P21 is ex-facie illegal and arbitrary. Hence, the writ petition.

4. Heard; the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader.

5. The Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 (Act No.42 of 1994) ('Act' in short), is enacted to provide for the regulation of removal, storage and transplantation of human organs and tissues for therapeutic purposes and for the prevention of commercial dealings in human organs and tissues and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

6. The Act permits and regulates organ and tissue transplantations among near-relatives and non-near-relatives as per the provisions of the Act, 1994, and the Rules made thereunder.

7. S.2(i) defines "near relatives" as spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister, grandfather, grandmother, gr