Undue delay in passing a detention order under the KAA(P) Act can undermine its validity by snapping the link between the last prejudicial act and the purpose of detention.

JUDGMENT :

Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 detention order dated 07.10.2025 passed against the petitioner/detenu under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 10.12.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, on 21.08.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thirssur City, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. Altogether, five cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order.

3. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.581/2025 of Kunnamkulam Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 118(2), 109(1), 238(b) r/w 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “ BNS ”).

4. We heard Sri. Shibin K. F., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is passed without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and the said delay would certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the order of detention was passed after complying with all the necessary legal formalities and after proper application of mind. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P1 detention order after the commission of the last prejudicial activity. However, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing a detention order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order and hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order.

7. While considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding the delay that occurred in submitting the proposal for detention and in passing the order, it cannot be ignored that an order under Section 3 (1) of KAA(P) Act has a significant impact on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. So such an order cannot be passed in a casual manner; instead, it can only be passed on credible materials after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is undue delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay.

8. In T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala , [(1989) 4 SCC 741], the Apex Court held that the question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pas