Arun Madan, J.-It is a revision petition challenging the order of the Additional District Judge, Ramganj Mandi (Kota) who returned the claim of the petitioners (plaintiffs) holding that the suit was not of urgent nature inasmuch as notice Under Section 80, CPC and 271 of the Municipalities Act ought to have been served upon the respondents-State and the Municipality prior to institution of the suit, but failed to do so.

.2. Shri Mahesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as per 5, 271 of the Municipalities

.Act no prior notice is required to institute a suit for permanent injunction except for declaration, inasmuch as in a suit for twin reliefs, i,e, seeking permanent injunction and declaration against the State and the Municipality, which are independent of each other, each of them could be claimed separately and independently in one suit, either by denying or accepting one of them and in these circumstances, the trial Court ought not to have returned the suit for permanent injunction but only suit for declaration ought to have been return thereby it committed material illegality with irregularity by returning the plaint in toto. Second contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that without framing the issues the trial Court could not have returned the plaint for want of prior notice Under Section 80, CPC or 271 of the Municipalities Act as such a dispute is an issue of fact inasmuch as the respondent-State and AEN PWD both have not at all raised an objection as to such a notice in their written statement.

3. ShriSharma cited decisions in (1) Dhian Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 274). (2) State of Bihar v. Panchratna Devi, AIR l98OPatna2l2, (3) Vasant Ambadas v. Bombay Municipality, AIR 1981 Bom 394. (4) Gowardhandasv. Calcutta Municipality, AIR 1970 Cal 539, whereas Shri Rajesh Mootha appearing on behalf of the State and the Municipality while placing reliance upon decisions in (1) State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 and (2) Ebrahimbhai v. State, AIR 1975 Bom 13, vociferously contended that the impugned order is perfectly legal warranting no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court Under Section 115 CPC.

4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival contentions so also perused the impugned order, first of all I would like to have a look at the citations relied upon at the bar during the course of arguments.

.5. In Dhian Singh v. Union of India (supra), the Apex Court observed that though the terms of Section 80, CPC are mean that the terms of notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. It was a case where the appellants gave the requisite notice Under Section 80, CPC to the respondent and the trial Court awarded to the appellants the price of the two trucks which had been fixed by them at Rs. 3,500/-both in the notice Under Section 80, CPC and the evidence led on their behalf , arid in appeal the High Court dismissed the claim of the appellants merely on the ground that they had only claimed Rs, 3500/-in the notice which they had served on the respondent Under Section 80, CPC and, therefore, they were not entitled to recover anything more than Rs. 3500/-. The Apex Court then held that a common sense reading of the notice Under Section 80 would lead any Court to the conclusion that strict requirements of that section had been complied with and there was no defect in the same such as to disentitle the appellants from recovering from the respondent the appreciated value of the trucks as at the date of the Judgment . The Apex Court then observed as under (at Page 282) :--

.“It is relevant to note that neither was this point taken by the respondent in written statement which it filled in answer to the appellant’s claim nor was issue framed in that behalf by the trial Court and this may justiir the inference that the. objection Under Section 80 had been wai