An express agreement between a legal practitioner and a client for the payment of fees governs the issue of fees, and the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act and the principle of quantum meruit are excluded.

MODI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff Roshanlal, an advocate of this Court, against the judgment of the District Judge, Udaipur, dated 18-5-1953, in a suit for recovery of certain fees agreed between him and the defendant.

( 2 ) THE material facts may be briefly stated as follows. It is alleged that on 25-81950, bhuramal defendant who is a contractor of means met the plaintiff in the court premises at Udaipur and told the latter that he wanted to institute a, suit against his son Hareshai and nephew Birdichand for a sum of Rs. 53,000/- and had tried to contact him more than once but was unsuccessful. An appointment was arranged between the parties and the plaintiffs case is that on 26-8-1950, Bhuramal executed a document Ex. P-1 in favour of Roshanlal, in which he stated that he had engaged the said advocate to conduct the case filed against his son Harsahai and nephew Birdichand along with another advocate Mr. Trivedi and that his remuneration for the entire case was settled at Rs. 1000/ -. IT was further stated that there were certain other questions regarding which there was a dispute between the defendant and Harsahai and Birdichand, and the remuneration therefor was also settled at Rs. 1000/ -. It may be pointed out here that the suit referred to in document Ex. P-l actually came to be filed on 29-91950. According to the plaintiff, however, the defendant had obtained his signature on a vakalatnama, and stated that he would get the same signed by the other advocate mr. Trivedi and then arrange to present it in the court. Certain consultations appear to have taken place between the parties, and the plaintiff alleges to have given advice from time to time, and it is sufficient to state for the purposes of the present appeal that Bhuramal managed to secure a promissory note from Harsahai for a sum of Rs. 53,000/- or so, and it was on 29-9-1950, that a suit was actually instituted against Harsahai based on the said promissory note. Meanwhile the defendant appears to have changed his mind for certain reasons which are not quite clear from the record, and gave a goby to the plaintiff roshanlal. On 3-11-1950, and 22-12-1950, the latter appears to, have given written notices to the defendant asking for the payment of his remuneration (Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-3) and it is said that Bhuramal made oral promises to pay but only to break down. This resulted in the present suit. The defendant resisted it mainly on the ground that he had brought his suit on the basis of the promissory note dated 31-8-1950, and that that had nothing to do with any cause of action which arose prior to that date or on 26-6-1950, which is the date of Ex. P-1. The defendant did not give any clear reply as regards the execution of Ex. P-l, and said that he had taken no advice or other work whatsoever from the plaintiff and, that the present suit was an attempt on his part to extract money by unprofessional methods and by misrepresentation. Both courts below have held that the execution of Ex. P-l by the defendant was proved and that the defendant had engaged the plaintiff as counsel in connection with the suit for Rs. 53,000/-, which he intended to file against nis son and nephew; but that so far as the second part of the agreement was concerned, no dispute had arisen at all and the lower appellate court was clearly of the opinion that that part of the agreement was a contingent one. The trial court, however, by applying the provisions of Sections 73 and 74, contract Act, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 250/- as compensation, and decreed the plaintiffs suit with proportionate costs accordingly, and the learned District Judge on appeal upheld that decree. The plaintiff has filed the present appeal from the above, judgment and decree.

( 3 ) THE principal contention raised in this appeal is that the courts below have entirely misdirected themselves in applying Sections 73 and 74, Contract Act or, as