JUDGMENT

R. B. Misra, J. - These two consolidated appeals against a common judgment of the Civil Judge, Bijnor, dated 9th March, 1962, arise out of restitution proceedings under Section 144, C. P. C. The facts leading up to these appeals lie in a narrow compass and are as follows :

2. Ami Chand and his brother filed Suit No. 445 of 1952 against the appellant Gopinath on 24th September, 1952 for declaration that plots Nos. 73 (area 16 bighas 7 biswas) and 76 (area 27 bighas) were their Bhumidhari plots, as, also for an injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with their possession. Shanti Prasad also filed Suit No. 387 of 1962 against Gopinath on. 26th August, 1952 in respect of plot No. 67 (area 87 bighas) for declaration of his Sirdari rights as also for an injunction restraining the appellant (Gopi Nath) from interfering with his possession. The plots in dispute are agricultural plots and constitute a substantial area. There was a dispute between the parties in respect of these plots which culminated in proceedings under Section 145, C. P. C. and the plots in dispute, along with crops, were attached on 10th October, 1951. 'I he proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were ultimately decided in favour of the appellant on 6th September, 1952, and the property, which was kept in the custody of a Supurdar, was released in appellant's favour. The appellant took formal delivery of possession on 12th October, 1952. It appears that in Suit No. 387 an interim injunction order was obtained on 24th September, 1952, while in Suit No. 445 of 1952, the interim injunction order was granted on 6th October, 1952. The two interim injunction orders were ultimately confirmed, after hearing both the parties, on 16th October, 1952. Both the suits were ultimately dismissed on 22nd March, 1960 with a definite finding that the plaintiffs in either case were not in possession on the date of the suit, and this is why both the suits were held to be barred by Section 42, Specific Relief Act.

3. The judgment and decree in both the suits were confirmed even by the first and the second appellate Courts.

4. According to the finding of fact recorded by the learned Munsif, the plaintiffs were not in possession on the date of suit; the possession was with the appellant, but he was dispossessed on account of the injunction order passed by the learned Munsif, during the pendency of the suit, as mentioned above. As the interim order of injunction was passed by the Court, it would be deemed to have been vacated after the disposal of the suit in favour of the appellant. Accordingly, he was entitled to get restitution over the plots in dispute. On these allegations he applied for restitution, which was objected to by the respondents on various grounds. The objection in the main in both the cases was that Section 144, C. P. C. had no application to the facts of the cases, and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any restitution.

5. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession on the date of the suit but subsequently lie was dispossessed on account of the injunction order. It was on account of the injunction order that the respondents came in possession.

6. The Advocate-General, appearing for the appellant, raised a number of contentions. He urged that if there had been no injunction order the appellant would have remained in possession in pursuance of the order of the Criminal Court in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. The appellant was found to be in possession on the (late of the preliminary order in the 145, Cr. P. C. proceedings. On the conclusion of the proceedings the appellant was accordingly allowed to remain in possession: the property was ordered to be released in his favour and indeed he obtained formal possession from the Supurdar on 12th October, 1952. He could not however retain possession on account of the interim injunction order which was confirmed on 16th October, 1952. No doubt the