The offence under Section 220(3) read with Section 162 of the Companies Act is a 'continuing offence' within the meaning of Section 472 of the CrPC and the petitioners were 'officers in default' as defined under Section 5 of the Companies Act.

1. - In this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners have prayed to quash the complaint and the orders dated, November 28, 1991 and January 18,1992 passed by Special Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Rajasthan, Jaipur in Criminal Complaint Case No. 492/89.

2. In order to appreciate the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it will be proper to set out necessary facts of the case before dealing with them.The Registrar of Companies, Jaipur has filed a complaint against the petitioners, the Company M/s. Kopyrite Ltd. and Shri M.R. Pathankar. At the outset it may be stated that the proceedings are in the initial stages as all the accused have not yet appeared in Trial Court after service. The petitioners, too, are not appearing and bailable warrants have been issued several times to secure their attendance in Court. Atone point of time the petitioners had appeared in Court through their Counsel, but on 29.11.91 their Counsel also did not appear and bailable warrants have been issued.

3. The complaint has been filed under Section 220(3) of the Companies Act. The petitioners and the co-accused M.R. Pathankar were made accused as being Directors of the Company, on the charge that they committed default in complying with the requirements of Sub-sections (i) and (ii) of Section 220 of the Act which required filing of copies of the Balance-Sheet and the Profit and Loss Account with the Registrar of Companies within a specified period. Sub-section (3) of Section 220 provides that every officer of the Company who is in default shall be liable to punishment as provided in Section 162 for a default in complying with the provisions of Sections 159, 160 or 161 of the Companies Act. Section 162 provides penalty of fine which may extend to 50 rupees for every day during which the default continues. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 25th October, 1989 and issued process against the accused. On 24th July, 1990 petitioners Dilip Kulkarni and Smt. Sheila M. Kulkarni appeared in Court through their Counsel Mr. Alankar Khanna and their personnel attendance for the day was dispensed with on the application. On next date, i.e. 25.8.90,the Presiding Officer was on leave and petitioners' personal attendance was again dispensed with for the day; but a direction was given to appear in person on the next date of hearing. Then, on 15.10.90 Mr. Mahendra Singh, Advocate appeared for all the accused except Shri M. R. Pathankar and moved an application under Section 205 of the Code to dispense with their personal attendance. However, no order was passed on this application and the case was adjourned to procure attendance of the co-accused M. R. Pathankar. The case was, then, adjourned on several dates as co-accused M.R. Pathankar could not be served. On 29.11.91, neither petitioners nor their Counsel appeared in Court and the concerned Magistrate at 4 p.m. passed order directing to issue available warrants against the petitioners. On next date the petitioners and their Counsel again absented and warrants also returned unnerved. Thereafter, Mr. Mahendra Singh, Advocate again appeared and the application filed by him to withdraw order of bailable warrants and to allow the petitioners to appear through a Counsel was dismissed on the same day. Thereafter, neither the petitioner nor their Counsel have appeared before the Trial Magistrate and they have moved this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 25.10.93.

4. Mr. Paras Kuhad, appearing for the petitioners, with his usual eloquence and vehemence contended that cognizance in the case has been taken by the Magistrate beyond six months after the alleged defaults were made by the petitioners, as such, it was barred under Section 468 of the Code. Learned Counsel also contended that the petitioners were merely Directors of the Company and since the company was having a Production Manager at the relevant point of time, they we