The limitation period for filing a suit for declaration regarding the illegality of removal from service starts from the date of dismissal of the review petition.

1. - This is plaintiffs second appeal directed against judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dated 10.2.1999 in Civil Regular Appeal No. 93/1998, who thereby dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional Munsiff Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City, Jaipur, in Civil Suit No. 1327/1988, who dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.

2. Factual matrix of the case is that plaintiff-appellant was appointed on permanent post of conductor with the respondent Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, on regular basis. A charge-sheet was served upon the plaintiff, on the basis of which, he was dismissed from service. According to plaintiff-appellant, the order removing him from service was passed without compliance of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as he was not supplied copies of relevant documents during the course of disciplinary enquiry. Statements of witnesses were also not recorded in his presence. He was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses nor was he given opportunity to lead his evidence. The enquiry was conducted on a single day. On completion of the enquiry, copy of the report was also not supplied to the plaintiff. He was also not heard on the quantum of punishment. The plaintiff was removed from service on 7.6.1979. Severe punishment of removal was awarded to him without following the provisions contained in the standing order. The plaintiff filed departmental appeal against the order of removal. The appellate authority, vide order dated 25.2.1982, without giving him any opportunity of hearing, dismissed the appeal. The appellant authority did not provide the copy of order dismissing the departmental appeal. The plaintiff thereupon filed review petition before the respondent no. 4 - the Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, which was also dismissed by the respondent no. 4 vide order dated 10.10.1985.

3. In the written statement, the defendant-respondents denied the fact that the plaintiff was appointed on the post of conductor on regular basis. It was pleaded that the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions of law and plaintiff was given opportunity to adduce his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses and also to produce his evidence. Copy of the enquiry-report was also made available to the plaintiff. A notice was given to the plaintiff on the quantum of punishment. The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

4. This court admitted this appeal on 26.7.1999 on the question "whether the appellate court, during the hearing of the appeal, can formulate a new question of law without there being an application to that effect by either of them?"

5. It may, at the out-set, be noted that while formulation of a question of law is a sine qua non for maintainability of second appeal, but at the same time it is also equally well settled that if a second appeal is admitted on substantial question of law, the High Court, while hearing it finally, can reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or even hold that no substantial question of law is involved but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 of the code, is impermissible without formulating a substantial question of law. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Umerkhan v. Bismillabi (2011) 9 SCC 684. :

11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the appellate j