1996 Supreme(Raj) 1270
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AT JAIPUR BENCH
M.A.A.Khan, J.
Shyam Sunder - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan and Anr. - Respondent
S.B. Criminal Revision Pet. No. 127 of 91.
Decided On : 9-09-1996
Violation of Section 16A of the PFA Act does not automatically vitiate the trial. The accused must show prejudice caused by the violation in order to have the proceedings quashed.
Headnote:
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT, 1954 - SECTION 16A - SUMMARY TRIAL - IRREGULARITY - PREJUDICE - CONVICTION - QUASHING OF PROCEEDINGS - SECTION 260(2) CR.P.C. - WARRANT TRIAL - SUMMARY TRIAL - DISTINCTION - SECTION 16(1) PFA ACT - INTERPRETATION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was convicted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA Act) for selling adulterated 'Desi Ghee'. The trial court conducted a warrant trial instead of a summary trial as required under Section 16A of the PFA Act. The petitioner appealed to the Sessions Judge, who set aside the conviction and ordered a retrial before the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the violation of Section 16A of the PFA Act did not automatically vitiate the trial. The court held that the accused must show prejudice caused by the violation in order to have the proceedings quashed. In this case, the court found that the petitioner had not shown any prejudice and therefore the conviction was upheld.
Issues: 1. Whether the violation of Section 16A of the PFA Act automatically vitiates the trial? 2. Whether the accused must show prejudice caused by the violation in order to have the proceedings quashed?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the provisions of Section 16A of the PFA Act are directory and not mandatory. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of U.P. v. Bhagat Kishor Joshi, AIR 1964 SC 221, which held that a trial conducted in violation of a mandatory provision of law is void ab initio, but a trial conducted in violation of a directory provision is not void unless prejudice is caused to the accused.
Final Decision: The High Court set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and restored the appeal of the petitioner to the Sessions Judge for disposal on merits.
JUDGMENT
1. - In this case the petitioner was found offering for sale and did actually sell to Hari Prakash, Food Inspector adulterated 'Desi Ghee' on 15.5.79 at his business premises, M/s. Shyam Sunder Narendra Kumar at Mandi Madar Gate, Ajmer. The Food Inspector filed the complaint on 20.8.79 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,. Ajmer who read over and explained the substance of the accusation to the petitioner on 7.9.82 and before recording any evidence in the case made over the case on 22.11.1983 to Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Ajmer for trial and disposal according to law. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, No. 2. Ajmer completed the trial of the petition and vide his judgment and order dated 8.2.89 found him guilty of the offence under section. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), convicted him therefor and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for six months and pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- for his guilt. The petitioner appealed to the Sessions Judge, Ajmer.
2. A number of objections appear to have been taken by the petitioner before the learned Sessions Judge against the judgment and order as made by the learned Magistrate against the petitioner. One of such objection was that since the offence under section. 7/16 of the Act was triable as a summary case as per Section 16A of the Act but more than one Magistrate conducted the trial in the present case. Relying on Man Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 (2) R.L.R. 553 , the learned Judge accepted the contention of the petitioner and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Magistrate but instead of acquitting the petitioner of the offence under section. 7/16 of the Act he sent the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer directing him to hold the trial of the petitioner and dispose of the case according to law and in the light of the decision of this court in Man Singh's case (supra). It is against such order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 10.5.91 that this petition under section. 397/401 Cr.PC has been filed in this court.
3. On 16.8.91 this Bench heard the parties and being of opinion that there was some conflict of opinion over the effect of non-compliance of the provision contained in Section 16A of the Act referred the following question for the opinion of a larger Bench -
"If an offence under section. 16(1) of P.F.A. Act which has to be tried in a summary manner has been tried as a warrant case then whether merely because it has been so tried, the proceedings are vitiated or it is a mere irreqularity and it is further necessary for the accused to show that as a result of the trial of the case as a warrant case prejudice has been caused to him ?"
4. After examining a number of cases including Ram Chandra v. State, 1980(1) F.A.C. 334 , Budh Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1986 P. & H. 130 (F.B.) , Brij Lal v. State of Punjab and Haryana, 1989 (1) F.A.C. 282 , Mahavir Prasad v. State of Punjab and Haryana, 1989 (1) F.A.C. 282 , Jaswant Singh v. Union of Territory Chandigarh, 1991 F.A.J. 154 , Mahendra Singh v. State of Haryana, 1991 F.A.J. 184 , Man Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra), V.M. Abdul Rehman v. Emperor, AIR 1927 PC 44 , Pulkuri Kottaya and Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 , Gopal Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 S.C. 986 ; State of U.P. v. Bhagat Kishor Joshi, AIR 1964 S.C. 221 and Bimal Kumar Khalsa v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1988 P. & H. 95 the larger Bench answered the above question in the following manner :
"If in the light of the aforesaid case law we give a second look to the provisions of Section 16A of the Act and paraphrase the same, we find that the Legislature has provided for summary trial in cases where the cases relate to offences under section. 16(1) of the Act. But at the same time the Legislature has not ousted the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to have warrant trial of the case. The rider placed by the Legislation is that it is only
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