Anupinder Singh Grewal, J.

The State of Rajasthan through the instant petition has challenged the order passed by the competent authority under the Payment of Wages Act dated 26.7.1997 (Annex.2) in PWA Case No. 285/1996 and the order passed in appeal by the District Judge on 2.4.2002 (Annex.4) in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 60/1998.

2. The respondent No. 1 had preferred an application under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 stating therein that he had not been paid by the appellant for the period from 1.3.1994 till 31.12.1994 although he was employed at a monthly salary of Rs. 1,300/-. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act while allowing the application of the respondent-applicant directed that a sum of Rs. 13,000/- as outstanding wages, Rs. 13,000/- as compensation and Rs. 200/- as expenses of the claim be made to him.

3. The Authority had relied upon the evidence of the respondent-applicant as well as two witnesses PW2 and PW-3 that he had done the work of operating and repairing electric motors. He had also done motor winding and repairing in the department. He had not been paid the salary with effect from 1.3.1993 till 31.12.1994 whereon he was removed by an oral order. Thereafter, he had been doing the work of the department but not on a regular monthly salary basis. PW-2 Rasrulla Khan as well as PW-3 Phatumal had also supported the claim of the applicant by stating that he had been working under Assistant Engineer, Nohar for the said period at a salary of Rs. 1300/- which was not paid to him. The authority had also condoned the delay in preferring the application by accepting the explanation put forth by the applicant that he had earlier been taking up the matter with higher officers who had orally assured that the payment would be made.

4. The order of the competent authority was challenged by the petitioner-appellants in appeal before the District Judge, Hanumangarh. There was a delay of about a year in preferring the appeal which has not been condoned while dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation vide order dated 2.4.2002.

5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the delay on the part of the State in preferring the appeal should have been condoned as it had been sufficiently explained.

6. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that the order of the Appellate Court is under the facts and circumstances perfectly justified especially when the State has not been able to make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

7. There is no gainsaying that the expression "sufficient cause" is not to be interpreted in a pedantic manner: It has to be construed liberally to ensure that the ultimate cause of justice is not subverted. Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that with efflux of time certain rights accrue to the other party and it is at times difficult on too harsh to set the clock back.

8. It is also well settled that some latitude is permissible while condoning the delay on the part of the State as after all it is the public cause which is being served. The States bureaucratic machinery with its characteristic red tapism including procedural note making and file pushing is often found wanting in preferring appeals within limitation. It is apposite of refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, 2013 (12) SCC 649 wherein while considering earlier judgments on the subject the principles applicable for condonation of delay were laid down:-

21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2 The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper sprit, p