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2013 Supreme(SC) 868

Supreme Court of India
ANIL R. DAVE & DIPAK MISRA, JJ.
Esha Bhattacharjee
Versus
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others
Civil Appeal Nos.8183-8184 of 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24868-24869 of 2011)
Decided On : 13-09-2013

IMPORTANT POINT
The Supreme Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.

Headnote:Indian Limitation Act of 1963, Section 5 -Condonation of delay-"sufficient cause"- The principles that can broadly be culled out are:

        i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

        ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

        iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

        iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

        v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

        vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

        vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

        viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

        ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

        x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

        xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

        xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

        xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

        Some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:-

        a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

        b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

        c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

        d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. (Para 16)

       Facts of the Case :

        The grounds urged in the affidavit and the stand put forth by the respondents herein for condonation of delay of about 2449 days are that they were not aware of the order passed by the learned single Judge till they received the notice of the contempt application and thereafter because of miscommunication between the counsel and the parties no steps could be taken and, eventually, an application for vacation of stay was filed and thereafter, the appeal was preferred. That apart, it has been urged that if delay is not condoned there will be great miscarriage of public justice resulting in public mischief and cause of justice would be defeated if the meritorious matter like the present one is thrown at the threshold.

       Findings of the Court :

        A statutory committee cannot remain totally indifferent to an order passed by the court and sleep like "Kumbhakarna". The persons chosen to act on behalf of the Managing Committee cannot take recourse to fancy and rise like a phoenix and move the court. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice. Plea of lack of knowledge in the present case really lacks bona fide.

       Result : Appeals allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench condoning delay set aside.

       

Judgement Key Points

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What is the approach to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act in this case?

What factors should be considered in determining whether delay of a short duration versus inordinate delay justifies condonation?

What are the consequences of condoning or not condoning a very long delay in filing appeals or applications against interim orders?


Judgment :-

Dipak Misra, J.

1. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

2. The singular question that we intend to address in these appeals, by special leave, is whether the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta is justified in entertaining the CAN No. 365 of 2011 for condoning the delay of 2449 days in A.S.T.A. No. 10 of 2011 preferred against the interim order dated 25.2.2004 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 6124(W) of 2004. It is also worthy to note that the Division Bench in A.S.T.A No. 10 of 2011 in A.S.T. No. 13 of 2011 had directed stay of further proceedings in connection with A.S.T. No. 346 of 2004. Needless to say, the said order is consequential as whole thing would depend upon the issue pertaining to condonation of delay.

3. Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are essential to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present appeals are that the appellant, an Assistant Teacher in language group (Bengali), invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by preferring a writ petition seeking approval of her appointment and for certain other reliefs. The learned single Judge on 25.2.2004 taking note of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein and further noticing the fact that in spite of notice none had appeared on behalf of the concerned respondents, issued a direction that during the pendency of the application the services of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Bengali in Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (HS) at Abhoynagar in the district of Howrah shall not be disturbed until further orders. As the said order was not complied with, the appellant filed the contempt application being C.P.A.N. No. 1016 of 2004. Be it noted, learned counsel for the petitioner communicated the order to the school authorities but the said communication was not paid heed to. On 24.1.2006 the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Howrah, directed the said school authorities to comply with the direction issued by the learned single Judge. Despite the said direction the order was not complied with. It may be mentioned here that an undertaking was given before the learned single Judge and on that basis C.P.A.N. No. 1016 of 2004 was disposed of. As the factual matrix would further unfurl a new managing committee was constituted in place of the erstwhile managing committee of the school on 21.11.2009 and the appellant was not allowed to join her duty. Being constrained, she preferred another contempt petition No. C.P.A.N. No. 1506 of 2010 wherein the learned single Judge vide order dated 13.5.2010 referred to his earlier order and directed that the District Inspector of Schools (SE) would ensure due compliance of the order. That apart, a direction was issued that the concerned police authority should see to it that the Secretary and the teacher-in-charge of the concerned school implement the order in allowing the petitioner to join her duties. After the said order came to be passed, the appellant herein joined her duties as Assistant Teacher with effect from 14.6.2010. Though the appellant was allowed to join, yet she was neither permitted to sign the daily attendance register, nor allotted any work nor paid her salary. Being impelled, she filed an application for contempt, C.P.A.N. No. 1506 of 2010, and on 24.12.2010 the learned single Judge directed for personal presence of the Secretary and teacher-in-charge of the school. At this juncture, the Managing Committee and the Secretary of the school preferred an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. The said application was seriously resisted by the appellant by filing an affidavit and, eventually, by the impugned order the Division Bench condoned the delay. Be it noted, the Division Bench has also passed an interim order of stay. The said orders are the subject-matter of assail in these appeals by special leave.

4. We have heard Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, learned counsel for the appellant,

















































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