The Court can quash proceedings under the SC/ST Act based on a compromise if it does not contravene the Act's objectives, and the compromise is made with free will.

ORDER

1. By way of this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused-petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer to quash the FIR No.0176/2021 registered at Police Station Sayla, District Jalore seeking petitioner’s prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B of IPC and under Sections 3(1)(f) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during pendency of the investigation, the petitioner has entered into a compromise with the complainant and the written compromise has been placed before the Investigating Officer, pursuant to direction given by this Court on 05.08.2022, who has verified the same.

3. Learned counsel for the complainant while accepting factum of compromise submits that the complainant has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the FIR has been registered under the provisions of SC/ST Act, the same cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. He, however, accepts the factum of compromise having been entered into without coercion and duress.

5. In order to support his contention that FIR/proceedings under the provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ’SC/ST Act’) can be quashed, learned counsel for the petitioner invites Court’s attention towards the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramawatar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228.

6. In the above referred case of Ramawatar (supra), Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed thus :

"12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.

13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court.

The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/ compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that ven though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do ’complete justice’. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr. has eloquently clarified this point as follows: ’48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction