JUDGMENT :

MADAN GOPAL VYAS, J.

1. The present civil miscellaneous appeal is listed in Defects category today. As per office report, the appeal is time barred by 678 days and the appellant has preferred an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional. It is further submitted that after receiving the certified copy of the judgment dated 22.02.2017, the same was sent to legal department of the school and the appellant was instructed to file an appeal against the said judgment. Thereafter, the appellant took steps and filed the present appeal. Thus, it is prayed that the delay in filing the present appeal may be condoned.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties on application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Perused the material available on record.

5. On perusal of material available on record, it is clear that the impugned judgment was passed on 22.02.2017 by the learned trial court in the presence of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Thus, it is clear that the appellants were represented by their counsel in the learned trial court. However, the appellant applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 13.04.2018, i.e. after a lapse of one year and 2 months and the same was served to the appellants on 21.4.2018. Not only this, even the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants before this Court on 10.4.2019, i.e. almost after one year from the date of getting the certified copy of the impugned order. No sufficient reasons are pleaded by the appellant as to why he could not get certified copy of the order for such a long period and file the instant appeal within the period of limitation.

6. In Basawraj vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona-fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

7. It is a settled principle of law that generally justice should not be denied merely on technical grounds but if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, such delay ought not to be condoned unless the applicant is able to satisfy the court that he was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting the case. Since no sufficient reasons have been put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant to explain such a long delay of 678 days in filing the present appeal, the present application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed.

8. Consequently, the present application for condonation of delay and the appeal are hereby dismissed.

9. No order as to costs.