The court affirmed that compliance with the Industrial Disputes Act's procedural requirements is essential for lawful termination of employment.

ORDER

1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the present writ petition is disposed of finally, at this stage.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-employer challenging the impugned award dated 16.01.2020, passed by the Labour Court & Industrial Tribunal, Kota, under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby claim of the respondent-workman has been allowed by declaring termination of his services with effect from 04.09.1995 to be illegal and bad in the eyes of law and further a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- along-with interest @ 9% per annum has been given in favour of the respondent-workman.

3. Learned counsel Mr.Vibhor Sharma, appears on behalf of the petitioner, made following submissions while challenging the impugned award:-

1. The respondent-workman was initially employed on 01.09.1989 on daily wage basis with the present petitioner-employer and his appointment was not on regular basis and as such his services were terminated in 1992.

4. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent-workman challenged dis-continuance of service by filing S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.3896/1992 and this Court on 26.05.1992, passed an ex-parte interim order directing the petitioner-employer not to terminate services of the respondent-workman while allowing him to continue in the service.

5. Learned counsel submitted that the said writ petition finally came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 01.09.1995 on account of the respondent-workman having an alternative remedy under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such liberty was granted to the respondent-workman to approach the Labour Court.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that this Court while deciding the writ petition of the respondent-workman also came to the conclusion that the respondent had not disclosed the complete details in his writ petition but in the reply filed by the petitioner, the date of retrenchment was given as 13.05.1992 and as such the prayer, which was made by the respondent initially for regularization, was also not considered.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that the reference, which was to be made to the Labour Court, was in respect of termination of services of the respondent-workman with effect from 13.05.1992, as whether such order of termination was valid or not.

8. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court, while allowing the claim of the petitioner, has not given any finding about working of the respondent for 240 days prior to the date of his termination.

9. Learned counsel submitted that if the respondent-workman was allowed to work on account of an interim order passed by the High Court, no such benefit could have been given by counting working of the workmen on account of some interim order passed by the Court.

10. Learned counsel submitted that the initial date of appointment of the petitioner was in the year 1989 and his alleged termination in the month of May 1992 was also not preceded by working of 240 days and as such there was no violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the Act of 1947'), as was alleged by the respondent-workman.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer has drawn attention of this Court towards a document (Annex.8), where details of Mustor Roll have been given and if May, 1992 is taken as the date of termination of services of the respondent-workman in preceding 240 days, he had only worked in the months of May, June, October and November, 1991/May 1992.

12. Learned counsel submitted that if viewed from any angle, the alleged termination of services of the respondent-workman could not be said to be in violation of any law and as such the Labour Court, while passing the award, has wrongly awarded a lump-sum compensation to the respondent-workman.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that any order passed by the Court or any act of the Court, will not prejud