The court emphasized the limited scope of interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., affirming that charges can only be quashed in exceptional cases where allegations are patently frivolous.

ORDER :

(Sameer Jain, J.)

By way of the instant petition, a challenge is made to the order impugned dated 30.11.2018, whereby the order dated 18.08.2018, wherein charges were framed against the petitioners under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC, has been upheld in revision.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the complainant/respondent-Smt. Lajwanti lodged FIR No. 29/2017 at Police Station-Mahil Thana Jaipur (West) for the offence under Sections 498A, 406, 419, 420, 427, 120B of IPC and section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Thereafter, pursuant to investigation, the petitioners were charge-sheeted for the offence under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC and section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Consequently, charges were framed against the petitioners, vide order dated 18.08.2018, under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC. Being aggrieved of the said framing of charges, the petitioners preferred a revision petition. However, vide order impugned dated 30.11.2018, the charges so framed under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC, were maintained and the revision was dismissed. As a result, the petitioners have approached this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for the quashing of the orders dated 30.11.2018 and 18.08.2018 and the consequent, cancellation of charges framed against the petitioners.

3. In this background, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order impugned is ex-facie perverse and has been passed in contravention of the material available on record. To elucidate upon the said contention, following grounds have been raised, enumerated herein-under:-

3.1 That marriage between the complainant/respondent-Smt. Lajwanti and the only son of the petitioners-Rajesh was solemnized on 24.02.2014.

3.2 Since before the solemnization of the said marriage, the petitioners i.e. mother in-law and father-in-law of the complainant/respondent, have been residing in Gujarat. They have not resided with the respondent/complainant, except on their annual visits to Jaipur.

3.3 The complainant/respondent was never keen to establish familial relations with the petitioners as well as their son i.e. husband-Rajesh and therefore, on the pretext of obtaining a divorce and harassing the petitioners, the complainant/respondent has concocted a false narrative and maliciously implicated the petitioners. The said fact is corroborated by the fact that the complainant/respondent has already obtained divorce from her husband-Rajesh from the Meena Community Panchayat on 13.08.2018.

3.4 That in the FIR No. 29/2017, no specific allegations have been levelled against the petitioners, thereby exhibiting that the allegations so levelled are false and fabricated.

3.5 That in pursuance to an agreement dated 11.12.2015, the petitioners have executed a gift deed in favour of the complainant/respondent, wherein the subject property was a shop. Therefore, contrary to the claims of the complainant/respondent, no offence as alleged by the charges so framed, is made out.

3.6 That reliance was also placed on the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh: Criminal Appeal No. 1457/2015.

4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has relied upon the charge-sheet dated 28.04.2017 as well as the contents of the FIR No. 29/2017 and has submitted that the charges against the petitioners have been framed in conjunction with the allegations so levelled and the corroborative material available on record. Therefore, no interference with the order impugned is called for.

5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the material available on record.

6. At the outset, it is made clear that exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is an exception and not the Rule and it is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Therefore, whilst exercising jurisdiction under Section