1953 Supreme(Raj) 162

Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench
Wanchoo C.J. & Ranawat, J.
Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multi-purpose Union Ltd., Dholpur - Appellant
Versus
Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, Jaipur - Respondents
Misc. Writ No. 80 of 1953
Decided On : August 29, 1953

Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Scope—Petition may be dismissed if it drafted.(b) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, sec. 133(3)—Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1950 —Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951 (framed on 30/03/1951)—Rules not required to be placed before State legislature—Part B States (Laws) Act, sec. 6.(c) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Certiorari—Assumption of jurisdiction dependency on collateral matters—High Courts power to issue certiorari—High Court cannot issue certiorari where tribunal competent to decide collateral matters giving jurisdiction—Motor Vehicles Act, sec. 64 and Rule 108.(d) Motor Vehicles Act, sec. 64—Appeal—Appeal prepared under sec. 64 (a)— Appellate Authority cannot cancel permit unless foundation laid under 64 (f).(e) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Error apparent on face of record—Meaning— Mere in consistency in decision not error on face of record.(f) Constitution of India, Arts. 19(6), (14 and 226— Reasonableness—Test to the applied to Law and not to every order under Law—Motor Vehicles Act—Grant of permit—Reasonableness of order—High Courts competence to interfere.(g) Motor Vehicles Act, sec. 47—Principles not exhaustive—Constitution of India Art. 14—High Court not competent to scrutinize orders under sec. 47.

       An application under Art. 226 should be concise and to the point, should clearly indicate the facts on which it is based and the grounds on which the relief is sought and the nature of the relief desired, with due realization of the position that this Court is not a court of revision or appeal under that Article. Ill-drafted petitions containing much irrelevant matter may be dismissed on that Very ground. (Para 2)

       The Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1950, did not contain any provision corresponding to sec. 133 (3) of the Motor Vehicles, therefore, which were famed on the 30/03/1951, were not required to be placed before any legislature. The Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 continued in force the rules which had been made in Rajasthan on the 30/03/1951, and these rules were to remain in force unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was, therefore, un-necessary to place these rules which had already been passed on the 30/03/1951, and which were continued by the Part B States (Laws) Act at a time when there was no duly constituted legislature in Rajasthan and legislative power vested in the Rajpramukh under Art. 358 of the Constitution, before the legislature which met, for the first time, in Rajasthan in March, 1952. It is true that the proviso to sec. 6 says that the rules will be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, but the proviso, did not require that the rules should be placed before the legislature in Rajasthan when it came into existence in March, 1952, for sec. 133 (3) was a new provision which became applicable to Rajasthan, for the first time, on the 1st April and would apply to all rules framed after that date, and not to rules which were deemed to have been framed under the corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, by virtue of the proviso to sec. 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act. Therefore, all those rules, which are in existence since the 30/03/1951, and have not been amended after the 1/04/1951, did not require to be placed before the legislature. (Para 7)

       In every case it has to be seen whether the decision, which is challenged by a writ of certiorary, is on a point collateral to the merits of the case or a part of the very issue which a lower court has to enquire into. If it is the former, certiorary will lie; but if it is the latter, certiorari will not be granted. The question whether the matter is collateral or part of the very issue in the case depends upon the powers granted to the tribunal by the legislature.

       Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes that any person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the Regional Authority an opportunity of being heard. Rule 108 provides for appeals against orders of the Regional Transport Authority, and prescribes the period within which the appeal has to be filed, and the manner in which it shall be filed. Reading sec. 61 with rule 108 the conclusion is obvious that the Appellate Authority has the widest power and conies within the second class of tribunals stated above and we cannot interfere with their decision on a writ of certiorari. (Paras 10 & 12)

       Where an appeal has been made under clause (a) against the refusal of a permit the Appellate Authority will generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but will not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by clause (f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. If such objection has been made then it does not matter whether that particular person appeals or not. In such a case, on an appeal under sec. 64(a), the Appellate Authority may consider the objection of the nature specified in clause (f) before the Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter. The same applies to the other clauses of sec. 64. (praa 15)

       The error of law envisaged should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was error. Where two views are, however, possible, or where the decision as to whether there is error of law can only be arrived at after long arguments, such error cannot be called error of law apparent on the record. Some inconsistency in the argument of the Tribunal with respect to various points which it decided, cannot be called an error of law apparent on the face of the record. (Paras 16 & 18)

       The test prescribed in Art. 19(6) has to be applied to the Law, and it has to be seen whether the law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right. Once it is clear that the law is reasonable, we find it difficult to hold that every order passed by any authority constituted under the law has again to undergo the test of reasonableness, and if it fails to pass that test, it is liable to be set aside as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right contained in Art 19 (1) (g).

       The Motor Vehicles Act is a complete Code in itself containing a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits and providing a regular hierarchy of administrative bodies to deal with the regulating of transport by means of motor vehicles. It is, in these circumstances, difficult to see how the High Court can interfere with the decision of the Transport Authorities granting or refusing to grant permits in every case on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory.

       When, therefore, it is said that the decisions of the transport authorities granting or refusing to grant permits are liable to be reviewed by the courts and set aside if they are unreasonable and arbitrary, the obvious intention is to use Art. 19(6), for testing every order any law, even though the law itself might have passed the test of reasonableness. We do not think that Art. 19(6) was meant to be applied in this way. (Para 26)

       The principles laid down in sec. 47 are of a general nature and are not exhaustive in details and it is open to the Transport Authorities to consider acceptance or rejection of particular applications on further principles which must all be shown to be in the interest of the public. It may perhaps be advantageous, that these further principles may also be prescribed by the State Government in the rules. But even the absence of such further principles from the rules will not, entitle the court to scrutinize every single order passed by a Transport Authority, and see whether it denies to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. (Para 27)