1954 Supreme(Raj) 185

Rajasthan High Court, Full Bench
Wanchoo C.J. Bapna & Dave, JJ.
Th. Amar Singh - Appellant
Versus
The State Of Rajasthan - Respondents
D.B. Civil Misc. Writ Cases under Art. 226
Decided On : August 23, 1954

Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, Art. 31-A—Acquisition or resumption—Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act 1952—Name alone no indication that Act is for resumption and not for acquisition -Payment of Compensation clear proof that Act is for acquisition.(b) Constitution of India, Art. 31-A (2)(a)—Estate (jagir)—Bhomichara holdings in Marwar (Rajasthan) whether jagirs—Marwar Land Revenue Act, sec. 169—Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of jagirs Act.(c) Constitution of India. Art. 14—Discriminatory legislation—Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption or Jagirs Act—Resumption of jagirs—Criteria—Progressive resumption only an administrative convenience and not discriminatory.(d) Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act sec. 22 (l)(g)—Schools hospitals etc. —Only such buildings as have become dedicated to public may be resumed. (Para 21)(e) Constitution of India, Art 31—Public Purpose—Resumption of Jagirs—Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act.—Resumption a pubic purpose.(f) Constitution of India, Art. 31—Grants— Jagir grants in Rajasthan—Plea that these were very old—Legislature competent to resume for public purpose.

       It is true that the Act is called "The Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952" but the name alone is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the Act provides for resumption and not for acquisition. What we have to see is the pith and substance of the Act to find out whether it is an Act for purposes of acquisition or merely for resumption of jagir lands. The very fact, that the Act provides for payment of compensation is the clearest possible indication that the Act is for the acquisition of jagirs, and not for resumption as that word is well understood. Resumption implies taking back by the person who grants the land, and there can be no liability to pay compensation when such taking back takes place because of breach of conditions of the grant. Here the property is being taken away not because of any breach of condition of any grant under which it was given to the jagirdars, but on payment of compensation. An examination of the Act, therefore, clearly shows that this is an Act providing for acquisition of jagir lands whatever may be the words used the convey that idea. The application of Art. 31-A therefore, cannot be excluded on the ground that this is not an Act for acquisition of estates. (Para 7)

       Whatever may be the origin of bhomichara tenure, it was not different from a jagir after the 6th of April, 1949, when the Marwar Tenancy Act and the Marwar Land Revenue Act came into force. By virtue of sec. 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, bhomichara jagirs must also be deemed to be grants from His Highness, and therefore, at the time when the impugned Act came into force bhomichara tenure was also a grant in the former State of Marwar. As it was a grant in the former State of Marwar, it. would be covered by the word Jagir used in Art. 31-A(2)(a) assuming that the jagir there has to be some kind of a grant. Even if bhomichara tenures are not jagirs within the meaning of sec. 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, and therefore, are not jagirs within the meaning of Art. 31-A (2)(a), they must be held to be estates within the meaning of Art. 31-A (2)(a) wherein estate is defined as having the same meaning in relation to any local area as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area.

       In the Marwar Land Revenue Act are defined the words estate, land revenue, and Mahal in sec. 4. An estate under the Marwar Land Revenue Act is merely a Mahal or Mahals held by the same landlord, and the Mahal is any area which has been separately assessed to land revenue. All that we have to see, therefore, is whether the lands which the bhomichara jagirdars hold are separately assessed to land revenue. Revenue is defined as any sum payable to the Government on account of an estate or survey number. The definition of the words land revenue is very wide and includes any sum payable to the Government on account of an estate. It is not in dispute that bhomi chara jagirdar used to pay a certain sum of money, which was called foujbal to the former State of Marwar. From the affidavits filed by the parties, it is clear that though the sum was originally fixed as one lump sum for the whole tract, it was divided between the various jagirdars of Mallani division. When this division was made, it is said that some jagirdars were exempted from payment and this exemption was also accepted by the former State of Marwar. Accepting these statements as correct, the fact remains that the bhomichara jagirdars had interest in land and has been paying a certain sum of money to the former State of Marwar. These payments were shown entered in the State records against the jagirs held by the bhomichara jagirdars and long before 1949 the position was that these payments were being made (whatever may have been their origin) for the lands which the bhomichara Jagirdars were holding.

       It is clear from the affidavits filed even by the applicants that the amount that was fixed as a lump sum for the whole Mallani tract was distributed and fixed separately on particular lands. This distribution was accepted by the former State of Marwar and as soon as that was done there was a separated assessment for the particular land. It is therefore, clear that Bhomichara jagirdars are paying land revenue and this land revenue is separately assessed with respect to separate parcels of land, and therefore their interest in land is an estate within the meaning of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, and therefore bhomichara tenure is an estate within the meaning of Art. 31-A of the Constitution. (Paras 10, 11 & 12)

       Secs. 20 and 21 read together, can only lead to this inference that the Act compels the State Government to acquire all jagirs, but gives it discretion to proceed class by class for the sake of administrative convenience. It is not open to the State Government not to apply this Act to any particular jagir which it arbitrarily wants to exempt. It must apply the Act to all the jagirs barring the excepted classes mentioned in sec. 20, though for administrative convenience it may take time to do so. This being the purpose of the Act, it cannot be said that the Act is discriminatory, for all jagirs will be resumed in course of time. (Para 16)

       The fact that certain grants of land were made to the applicant long ago, and they enjoyed certain rights under these grants cannot take away the legislative authority of the State to pass suitable laws for the acquisition of the rights of the grantees so long as the laws are within the competence of the lagislature,and are not hit by any provision in Part III of the Constitution. The mere fact that the rights are ancient in some cases or that they were granted by the Ruler or protected by any covenant (even if it be so) cannot take away the right of the legislature to legislate for a public purpose in the interest of the people of the State and acquire these rights, so long as the legislature acts within the filed reserved for it, and there is nothing in the law which violates the provisions of Part III. (Para 26)