1954 Supreme(Raj) 210

Rajasthan High Court
Wanchoo, C.J. & Modi, J.
Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd., Pali - Appellant
Versus
Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur - Respondents
D.B. Civil Writs Nos. 25 and 30 of 1954
Decided On : September 15, 1954

Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, Art, 226—Alternative remedy—Want of jurisdiction in Tribunal-Statute providing no appeal or revision— High Court will interfere.(b) Industrial Disputes Act, sec. 7—Appeal—Scope—Section provides for appeals from final order and not interlocutory order.(c) Industrial Disputes Act sec. 7(1) and(2) Constitution of Tribunal and appointment of member—Notification appointing for a particular period—Construction—Subsequent notification (after expiry of term) amending original notification—Effect—General Clauses Act, sec. 21—Amending notification—Operative prospectively and not retrospectively.

       Generally speaking, where the statute itself provides an appeal or a revision from the tribunal which is acting in excess of or on the absence of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere under its extraordinary powers under Art 226. But where there is no provision in the statute by way of appeal or revision and the alternative remedy is of a different kind, this Court would interfere if the want of jurisdiction is established, provided the remedy is not equally efficacious, convenient and beneficial.

       Thus where the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute was not appealable under sec. 7 of the Act it was held that there being no alternative remedy open to the applicants a writ petition challenging assumption of jurisdiction by the Industrial Tribunal was maintainable. (Paras 5 & 6)

       Sub-sec. 7 provides for the constitution of one or more industrial tribunals by the appropriate Government for the adjudication of industrial disputes. Sub-sec. (2) than provides for the appointment of members of the tribunal which may consist of one member or more* and where it consists of more than one member a chairman has to be appointed. It is obvious from the perusal of these two sub-sections that the law contemplates to steps, the constitution of the tribunal and the appointment of its personnel though the two things may be done at the same time by the same notification.

       The notification in this case was issued in the following terms :—

       In exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. XIV of 1947), the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute, for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Rajasthan, an Industrial Tribunal consisting of one member only and to appoint Shri Shardool Singh Mehta, as such member.

       This order comes into force with effect from 3/06/1953. The appointment is at present sanctioned for the financial year 1953-54.

       Held that the first paragraph says that the Government is constituting an industrial tribunal for adjudication of industrial disputes in Rajasthan. This is in compliance with sec. 7 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The paragraph then goes on to say that the tribunal shall consist of one member,and Shri Mehta is appointed such member. This is obviously in compliance with sub-sec. (2) of sec. 7. Then follows the second paragraph which says that the order would come into force with effect from the 3rd Of June, 1953. This obviously refers to the first paragraph constituting the Industrial Tribunal, and appointing Shri Mehta as member of it. Consequently, the notification of the 2/06/1954, constituting an industrial tribunal, did not put any limit on the duration of the tribunal, though it did limit the duration of the member Shri Mehta to the period ending the 31st of March, 1954, Shri Mehtas terms would, therefore, come to an end on the 31/03/1954, unless it was renewed earlier.

       A further notification was published in Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 5/06/1954, which deleted the following words from the notification of 2nd June 1953 :—

       The appointment is at present sanctioned for the financial year 1953-54.

       Held that the amending order, which was published. In this case on the 5th of June, 1954, cannot validate proceedings between the 1st of April, 1954. It can, at the best operate prospectively, i.e. from the 5th of June, 1954. Considering that it is possible under sec. 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act for a new sole member in case of a vacancy to carry on from where the case was at the time of his appointment, it seems to us only reasonable to hold that, if the same member is appointed some time later after his term had expired for any reason and a vacancy had occurred, he can also carry on from the same stage at which the case was when the vacancy occurred.