Dave, J.—This is an appeal by the defendants under Order XLIII Rule 1 Clause (c) C. P. C. from the order of the Civil Judge, Balotra, dated 10th November, 1952, appointing a receiver of their jagir.

2. The facts giving rise to it are that the plaintiff-respondents brought a monetary suit against the appellants for Rs. 15,000/-. The suit was filed on 30.10.52. On the same day the plaintiffs presented an application in the trial court saying that their claim involved a large sum, that the defendants jagir was likely to be resumed very soon because of the enactment of the Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. that if the jagir would be so resumed the realisation of the decree would not only be difficult but impossible, that the very purpose of bringing the suit would be defeated and therefore it was prayed that a receiver should be appointed for realising the income of the jagir and keep it in the custody of the court till the decision of the suit. One of the plaintiffs viz. Ridmal filed an affidavit in support of the application. Therein it was further mentioned that the defendants had transferred their jeep to their relative. Notice of this application was given to the defendants and 8th November, 1952, was fixed for hearing. That day the second plaintiff Nihal Chand presented another application saying that defendant No. 1 had become old and he had handed over the management of the jagir to his son, defendant No. 2, that defendant No. 2 was spendthrift, that he was wasting the income of the jagir and was intent upon defeating the plaintiffs decree. The court was, therefore, requested again to appoint a receiver.

3. In reply it was contended by the defendants that there was no provision of law for appointing a receiver in a money suit, that in case of the resumption of the jagir by the State, the defendants would get compensation and the plaintiffs would be entitled to realise his decree if there is any, that there was no charge of the plaintiffs debt on the jagir, that the plaintiffs in fact wanted to get attachment of the defendants property before judgment but since they had no good ground to make an application under that order they had resorted to this method and therefore their application should be dismissed.

4. The trial court thought that plaintiffs fear was reasonable and therefore it passed an order for the appointment of a receiver on a remuneration of Rs. 70/- per month on 10.11.52. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.

5. The appellants learned advocate has contended that the plaintiffs have neither a prima-facie case nor a good title to the property nor a charge over the property nor any special equity in their favour, that there was no question of even preserving the property from waste or alienation, that no steps were taken by the government for the resumption of the appellants jagir and even if it were to be resumed, the plaintiffs could satisfy their decree out of the compensation to be given in lieu of resumption, and that there being no good ground for appointing a receiver that order should be vacated.

6. Respondents learned advocate has on the other hand raised a preliminary objection that the trial court had a discretion to appoint a receiver whenever it thought just and con-venienrt to do so, and that the appellate court should not interfere with its discretion. He has referred to a Division Bench case of this Court, Mst. Goran vs. Jamnadas(l). In that case it was held that "a court of appeal will be slow to interfere with the discretion of the lower court in the appointment of a receiver, and would interfere only if satisfied that the discretion has not been exercised in accordance with settled principle of law."

7. It may be pointed out that in the above case it was not laid down as a rule that the appellate court would never interfere with the discretion of the lower court. All that was suggested was that an appellate court would not lightly interfere with the discretion of

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