Modi, J.—This revision raises an interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of sec. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. The material facts are briefly these. The petitioner Shrilal is a resident within the town municipality of Sikar. Opposite party No. 1 Manmath Kumar Misra is the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Sikar. Opposite party No. 2 Shanti Swaroop Goyal was its executive officer at the material time. A dispute arose between the petitioner and the municipal board over the erection of a wall to which the municipal board objected, but, which according to the petitioner he had erected on his own land. On the 18th March, 1957, the board gave a notice to the petitioner to dismantle the wall. The petitioner did not comply with this order. Thereupon the board ordered the demolition of the wall (obviously by its own men) on the 9th April, 1957. In the meantime the petitioner had instituted a suit in the court of the Munsiff Sikar and obtained an interim order of injunction against the board restraining it from demolishing the wall. The petitioners case is that this order was served on the Chairman, Manmath Kumar Misra, opposite party No. 1 at 11 a.m. on the 10th April, 1957, and yet this wall was demolished by the other accused and the respondents were a party to a conspiracy to demolish the petitioners wall. Thereupon the petitioner instituted the complaint, out of which this revision arises, against respondents Nos. 1, 2 and twelve others (with whom we are not concerned in this revision) under secs. 447, 427, 1203 and 147 I.P.C. in the court of the Frist Glass Magistrate: Sikar.

3. An objection was raised on behalf of the respondents here that the Magistrate was incompetent to take cognizance of the case against them as no sanction to prosecute them had been obtained from the State in accordance with the provisions of sec. 197 Cr. P.C., and without such sanction, their prosecution was illegal.

4. This objection prevailed with the Magistrate and so he dismissed the complaint for want of sanction so far as the present respond ants were concerned. The case was allowed to be proceeded with as respects the other accused. The petitioner then went in revision against the aforesaid order to the Additional District Magistrate Sikar who agreed with the order of trial court and dismissed the revision. The present revision has been filed from the aforesaid order.

5. It may be pointed out that the main contest in the courts below centered on the point whether the acts of the opposite parties complained against had not been done or did not purport to have been done within the discharge of their official duties, and, consequently, sanction to prosecute them within the meaning of sec. 197 Cr.P.C. was not called for. Both courts below repelled this contention, and, in my opinion, rightly. Suffice it to state, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned, that the position seems to me to be indisputably correct that the impugned acts of the respondents, assuming that they were individually responsible for them, were acts which are clearly relatable to the discharge of their official duties. Any contention to the contrary on this score must be held to be devoid of all force. Reference my be invited in this connection to my decision in Hariram vs. B.P. Sood (1).

6. This brings me to the controversy which has been raised at the bar of this Court which is that, leaving aside the case of respondent No. 2 who was and is the executive officer and was without doubt not removable save by the State Government, the same position could not be predicated to hold good in the case of the chairman. It is argued that a chairman of a municipal board is not only removable by the State but can also be removed by a vote of no confidence passed by a requisite number of members of the municipal board by sub-sec. (9) of sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalisties Act, 1951 (Act No.XXIII of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and, therefor

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