Bhandari, J.—All these three appeals arise in pre-emption suits. The principal point for determination in the first two appeals is as to the extent to which the provisions of the Alwar State Pre-emption Act (Act No. VII of 1946) hereinafter called the Alwar Act, are void under Art. 13(1) of the Constitution on the ground that they infringe the rights of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property as guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. In the third appeal, the question relates to the extent to which the custom of pre-emption was void under Art. 13(1). The determination of these points will require the examination of the correctness of the authorities of this Court in Punch Gujar Gaur Brahman{l) and Shankar Lal vs. Poonam Chand (2) and the other cases following these two authorities. These appeals came up for decision before Single Judges of Court and in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shri Audh Behari Singh vs. Gajadhar Jaipuria (3), these cases had been referred to the larger Benches and this Special Bench has been constituted to hear all these appeals. We propose to dispose of these appeals by one common judgment as the principal points in all these appeals have a close bearing on one another and call for interpretation of Art. 13 and 19 of the Constitution.

2. In Civil Second Appeal No 7 of 1954, the plaintiffs Patram and Hetoo instituted a suit on the 28th July, 1945 in the court of the Nizamat, Kishengarh (Alwar) for declaration that the sale of 14 plots of land situated in village Harooli (Distt. Alwar) by Harlal (Defendant No. 1) to Nathuram (Defendant No. 2) for Rs. 2,500/- by the sale-deed dated the 18th of August 1943 was void and illegal as it was made in contravention of sec. 129 of the Alwar State Land Revenue Code, 1925. The plaint was subsequently amended and the suit was converted into a suit for pre-emption. The pre-emptors based their claim on the grounds that they were the collaterals of the vendors and also the owners of the patti in which the plots were situated, and, as such under sec. 15 of the Alwar Act, they had a right of pre-emption as the vendee was mere a stranger. The suit was contested by the vendee and it was decreed by the trial court on the 25th of August, 1952. On appeal by the vendee it was remanded for fresh decision by the District Judge, Alwar, but the suit was again decreed by the trial Judge on the 23rd of January, 1953. Again an appeal was preferred by the vendee to the District Judge, Alwar, but the appeal was dismissed on the 21st of December, 1953. The vendee has filed Appeal No. 7 of 1954 to this Court.

3. The contention of the appellant is that sec. 15 of the Alwar Act had become void under Art. 13(1) of the Constitution on the date when the suit was decreed by the trial court i.e. on the 23rd of January, 1955 as the provisions of sec. 15 infringed the fundamental right of the vendor to dispose of the plots of land in dispute and the right of the vendees to acquire and hold them, and, as such, on the date of the decree the pre-emptors had lost their right of pre-emption and the suit of the pre-emptors should be dismissed following the authority of this Court in Shankarlal vs. Poonam Chand (2).

4. On behalf of the pre-emptors, it is urged that Art. 13 has got no application to the instant case as the sale had taken place on the 11th of August, 1943 before the Constitution had come into force and the suit had been filed and even the amendment of the plaint converting the suit into a suit for pre-emption was made prior to that date. It is also argued that the provisions of the Alwar Act were made for the purpose of preserving the homogeneity of the villages and consolidation of the holdings in so far as they related to the agricultural lands and they were thus in the nature of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred on a citizen by Art. 19(1). In this connection our attention is drawn to the fact that the Alwar

Click Here to Read the rest of this document