Shinghal, J.—Petitioner Gulabchand has been convicted by Municipal Magistrate, Ajmer, on September 10, 1962, of an offence under sec. 16(T)(a) read with sec. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one month and a fine of Rs. 200/-. In default of payment of fine, be has been ordered to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 2 months. The petitioner went up in appeal to Sessions Judge, Ajmer, but without success, and he has therefore filed the present revision petition.

2. The facts of this case are not in dispute. The petitioner is a confectioner and used to sell sweets at his shop in Karakka Chowk, Ajmer city. He professed to prepare the sweets with pure ghee. Food Inspector Kartar Singh P. W. 1 went to the petitioners shop on March, 10, 1962, at about 6-30 p.m. and gave him a notice (Ex. P. 1) for obtaining a sample of the ghee which was there at that time. The sample was taken by the Food Inspector who paid Rs.3,nP 15 as its price to the petitioner. One of the samples was sent to the Public Analyst for examination. Ex. P. 5 is the report of the Public Analyst according to which the sample was found to be adulterated. The petitioner was therefore prosecuted by the Municipal Prosecuting Inspector, Ajmer, who, it is claimed, had been authorised by the Administrator of the Ajmer Municipal Council to exercise the powers under sec. 20 of the Act. On trial, the learned Magistrate convicted and sentenced the petitioner as mentioned earlier.

3. Food Inspector Kartar Singh P. W. 1 was the only witness examined on behalf of the prosecution. The accused took the plea that he had purchased the ghee from M/S Ghanshyamdass Bholaram and that he had not made any adulteration in it. He produced certain receipts evidencing the purchase of ghee by him and examined four witnesses in his defence.

4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court could not have taken cognizance of the offence because the Municipal Prosecuting Inspector had no authority to prosecute the accused. It has been urged that under sec. 20 of the Act the prosecution could be instituted "by, or with the written consent • of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in that behalf by the State Government or a local authority". It is not the case that the prosecution was launched by the State Government and so the question for decision is whether it has been instituted by the local authority or by a person authorised by the State Government or the local authority. Mr. Bhargava has contended that the Municipal Council, which was the local authority for the area within the meaning of sec. 2(viii) of the Act, had already been superseded and that there could be no question of the prosecution being launched by or with the consent of that authority in this case. He has placed reliance on State of Bombay Vs. Parshottam Kanaiya Lal (l). The State Vs. Mohammedbux(2), City Corporation of Trivandrum Vs. V. P. N. Arunachalam Reddiar(3) and Chairman, Midnapore Municipality Vs. Mohan Tewari(4) to support his argument.

5. Learned Assistant Government Advocate has, in reply, advanced a two-fold argument. Firstly, he has urged that the Municipal Council is a body corporate and has a perpetual succession under sec. 8 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and that it therefore continued to remain in existence even after its supersession. The Administrator having been appointed by the State Government under sec. 295(5) (b) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, to exercise all the powers and duties of the Municipal Council, it has been contended that he could exercise the power under sec. 20 of the Act and that the Municipal Prosecuting Inspector having been authorised by him to institute the prosecution, the argument that the prosecution has not been made in accordance with the law is not tenable. Secondly, learned Assistant Government Advoc

Click Here to Read the rest of this document