DAVE, C.J.—These are two connected appeals and are both directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 10th August, 1964 by which, on a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by 13 electors of Kotputli Municipality, the learned Judge set aside the elections and co-options of the members of Kotputli municipality who were elected or co-opted as a result of the general election held in 1964. D.B. Special Appeal 21 of 1964 is by Suresh Chandra and others, whose election or co-option was set aside and appeal No. 38 of 1964 is by the State of Rajasthan, the Collector and the Returning Officer. They can conveniently be disposed of together.

2. The sole ground on which the learned Judge held the election to be void was that the notification issued by the Government, dated 26th November, 1965 for inviting objections against the proposed delimitation of the wards did not conform to the mandatory requirements of sec. 14(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, inasmuch as at least one month was not given to the electors to file their objections against the draft delimitation order. The learned Judge in taking the view which he did followed his earlier decision in Ram Krishna vs. State of Rajasthan (1). The only point that, therefore, arises for our consideration is whether the notification dated 26th November, 1963 fulfilled the requirements of sec. 14(2) of the Act and whether Krishnas case which was followed by the learned Judge laid down the law correctly. Sec. 14 of the Act runs as under:—

"14. Delimitation order—(1) The State Government shall by order determine—

(a) the wards in which such municipality shall be divided for purpose of elections to the board ;

(b) the extent of each ward ; and

(c) the number of seats, if any, reserved for members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, as the case, may be, in any ward.

(2) The draft of the order under sub-sec. (1) shall be published for filing objections thereto within a period of not less than one month and a copy of the same shall be sent to the board concerned for comments.

(3) The State Government shall consider any objection and the comments received under sub-sec. (2) and the draft order shall, if necessary, be amended, altered, or modified accordingly, and thereupon it shall become final."

The notification under challenge was in the following terms—

t;iqj] uoEcj 26] 1953

la[;k ,Q 4 ¼34½ ,ekbysdklh 1] 63] 4015&tSlk fd jktLFkku E;qfuflisfyVht ,DV] 1959 ¼,DV la- 38 lu~ 1959½ dh /kkjk 14 dh mi&/kkjk ¼2½ }kjk visf{kr gS] jkT; ljdkj mDr /kkjk dh mi/kkjk ¼1½ ds v/khu tks vkKk ikfjr djus dk fopkj j[krh gS mldk fuEufyf[kr izk:i] jktdh; xtV esa mlds izkklu dh rkjh[k ls ,d eghus dh vof/k ds Hkhrj Hkhrj mDr vkKk ds fo"k; esa] vkifr;ka nk;j fd;s tkus gsrq ,rn~}kjk izdkfkr fd;k tkrk gSA

jkT; ljdkj mi;ZqDr vof/k ds lekfIr ls iwoZ] fdlh Hkh O;fDr ls izkIr gqbZ vkifRr ij fopkj djsxhA ,slh vkifr;ka fyf[kr :i esa lEcaf/kr ftyk/khk ds tfj;s jkT; ljdkj dks Hksth tkuh pkfg;sA

3. The problem before us centres round a proper interpretation of the words within a period of not less than one month "occurring in sub-sec.(2) of sec. 4 of the Act reproduced above. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that for determining as to whether a particular period fixed in a given case is not less than one month, the date on which the notification is issued is to be included but the date on which the period of one month is to end, is not to be included; On the other hand it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that as least one month should intervene between the date of the notification and the last date on which the prescribed period is to terminate. In other words, it is urged that for a period to be "not less than one month" within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the. Act, clear one month must intervene and this can be brought about only when both the date on which the notification is i

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