1966 Supreme(Raj) 140

Rajasthan High Court
Modi & Tyagi, JJ.
Daulatram - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan - Respondents
D.B. Civil Ref. No. 4 of 1963
Decided On : July 05, 1966

Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, Art. 19(g) Plaintiff holding monopoly to ply buses on certain routes from before Constitution and continuing to ply bus thereafter till March, 1951— State cannot demand any payment under monopoly Contract after monopoly had become void.(b) Civil P.C., O. 7, R. 11—Applicability—Where law allows absolute discretion to plaintiff, Courts to accept his valuation.(c) Civil P.C., O. 7, R. 11—Provisions of Court Fee Act to over ride provisions of R. 11.(d) Fiscal Statute—Where two constructions possible, construction favouring subject to be adopted.(e) Court Fees Act, Sec. 7(iv)(c) Plaintiffs valuation final unless contrary to rules framed by High Courts.

       The plaintiff D. held a monopoly contract for plying passenger and goods motor service for hire on the Ganganagar Hindumalkote route via Sadhuwali from the princely State of Bikaner as it then was and which route fell within its territory, for a period of three years from the 1/01/1947; to the 31/12/1949, for Rs. 23,000/- payable per year. It is common ground between the parties that the plaintiff paid the sum of Rs. 69,000/- to the Bikaner State for the aforesaid period. It is further admitted that this contract was later extended upto the 30/06/1950. Meanwhile certain important political changes had taken place. The State of Bikaner lost its independent existence and became part of the United State of Rajasthan in the beginning of April, 1949 which in its turn became a Part B State under the Constitution of India and which came into force on the 26/01/1950. No fresh contract as such for the continuation of the monopoly in suit took place between the parties beyond the 30/06/1950 : the plaintiff contending, however, that the route in question had become open thenceforward and no longer remained his preserve while the defendant State maintained that the plaintiff did virtually enjoy the monopoly until the 31/03/1951. Even so, the defendant State demanded a sum of Rs. 23,000/- from the plaintiff for the alleged enjoyment of the monopoly by him on the route in question from the 1/07/1950, to the 31/03/1951, and on the plaintiffs refusal to pay the monopoly fee the State resorted to a proceeding under the Land Revenue Act for the recovery of the amount from him. Consequently the plaintiff after giving the requisite notice under sec. 180 C. P. C. instituted the present suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Ganganagar, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff did not and could not hold a monopoly on the route in question from the 1/07/1950, to the 31/03/1951, and that the demand by the State against him for the payment of Rs. 23,000/- was unjustified and unlawful. The plaintiff valued his suit both for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction at a sum of Rs. 300/- only and paid the requisite court-fees thereon.

       Before R. 11 can be rightly held to be applicable in a case it must be established that the plaintiff has unmistakably undervalued his claim which must necessarily involve the position that he has under-valued it in breach of some principle or provision of law. This cannot be predicated "of a case where the law allows the plaintiff to state his own valuation of the relief sought by him and or where such relief is incapable of a precise or definite valuation. In case of a conflict between procedural provision like that contained under O. 7, r. 11 C.P.C. and that contained in a fiscal enact-ment like the Court Fees Act, it is the provision in the latter Act which must prevail over that of the former.

       If two constructions of a fiscal enactment are possible, the construction more favourable to the subject should be adopted and enforced, rather than the one which imposes a greater burden on him.

       The plaintiff has an unfettered option to value his suit under sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act for the purposes of court-fees; it is not open to the courts to disturb such valuation, except in cases where the same may be found to be contrary to the rules made by the High Court, if any, under sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.

       A monopoly by which a particular person or a number of persons are precluded from exercising their fundamental rights guaranteed by Chapter III of the Constitution would be violative of , Art. 19(g) thereof and hence void after the coming into force of the Constitution. Assuming that the monopolist did actually enjoys, the monopoly, such a right was in its ultimate analysis no more than the ordinary incident of the right of the subject to use the public highway for pleasure or pastime or for business. Such user could not be said to be due to any extra-ordinary or special use of the highway which would require any special permission of the State. The plaintiff had no right whatever in law to prevent any other persons from acting likewise, once the Constitution had come into force. Any monopoly even if it existed in fact, in favour of the plaintiff for the period in question could not possibly be sustained in law and was entirely void and inoperative once the Constitution had come into force. That being so, the plaintiff is entitled in law to the declaration and injunction prayed for by him and the plaintiff is not liable to pay any monopoly fee whatever to the State for his allegedly plying his motor service on the Hindumalkote Ganganagar route via Sadhuwali for the period extending from 1/07/1950, to the 31/03/1951. (Paras 3, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29 and 30)