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1967 Supreme(Raj) 126

Rajasthan High Court
Chhangani, J.
Bhogilal Pandya - Appellant
Versus
Maharawal Laxman Singh - Respondents
S.B. Election Petition No. 12 of 1967
Decided On : September 08, 1967

Advocates Appeared:
S.N. Bhargava, for Petitioner; B.B. Desai, for Respondent

Headnote:Limitation Act (New) Secs. 12(1) and 29—Election petition is application and entitled to benefit of secs. 12(1) read with sec 29.

       The Election Law having provided for an application or petition to move for enforcement of rights of a civil nature and the New Limitation Act providing for limitation for applications under local special laws it is difficult to resist a conclusion that an election petition is an application. Any doubt in that connection can however be resolved by treating it as a suit and in that case also it is equally open to the petitioner to invoke sec. 12(1) read with sec. 29. (Para 12)

CHHANGANI, J.—The respondent No. 1 having raised the plea of bar of limitation a preliminary issue was framed as follows:—

"Whether the petition is barred by time and therefore liable to be dismissed?

2. Arguments were heard. There is no controversy over the facts. The respondent No. 1 was declared elected on 21.2.1967. The election petition was filed on 7.4.1967. The period from 21.2.1967 to 7.4.1967 is a period of 46 days if both the days mentioned are counted, whereas it is a period of 45 days if the date of the election is not counted. The petitioners case is that 21.2.1967 the day on which the respondent No 1 was declared returned cannot be counted in view of the provisions of sec. 12(1) read with sec 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and sec. 9 of the General Clause Act. In support of his arguments he relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court reported as T. C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and another (1) and Vidya-charan V. Khubchand(2). Reliance was also placed upon Thete Gopal Ramji V. Amolock Chand and others(3) and Kashinath V. Shibbem Lal(4). The Counsel for the respondent, however, took the stand that in view of the specific language of sec. 81 of the Representation of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act)sec. 12(1) of the Limitation Act or sec. 9 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. It was also contended that an election petition is neither a suit nor an application within the meaning of sec. 12(1) and 29(1) of the Limitation Act.

3. I have given the matter a very careful consideration and have come to the conclusion that the matter stands concluded by the two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first case is T. C. Basappa V. T. Nagappa and another(l). The question of limitation in that case arose under the following circumstances:—

Under sec. 81 of the Act, as it then stood, it was provided that the election petition may be presented within such time but not earlier than the date of the publication of the name or names of the returned candidate or candidates at such election under sec. 67 as may be prescribed. Rule 119 of the Representation of the people (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions Rules, 1951 provided the limitation in the following terms: —

"An Election petition calling in question an election may—(a) In the case where such petition is against a returned candidate, be presented under sec. 81 at any time after the date of publication of the notice in the official gazette name of such candidate under sec. 67 but not later than fourteen days from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under rule 113 that the return of election expenses of such candidate and the declaration made in respect there of have been lodged with the Returning Officer."

In that, case the notice of the return of election expenses was published in the Mysore Gazette, on the 31st March, 1952 and the election petition was received in the office of the Commissioner on 14th April, 1952. The respondent raised the plea of limitation. The Tribunal over-ruled the plea of limitation. In an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari the Mysore High Court held that the election petitioner was not entitled to exclude 31st of March, 1952 while computing the period of limitation On this ground and various other grounds the High Court issued a writ of certiorari and dismissed the election petition. On an appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court on the question of limitation and observed as follows: —

"The High Court seems to think that in computing the period of 14 days the date of publication is to be included. This seems to us to be an unwarrantable view to take which is opposed to the ordinary canons of construction. Dr. Tek Chand appearing for the respondent No. 1. plainly confessed his inability to support this view and we must hold therefore that there is no question of the Tribunals entertaining the election petition after the prescribed period in the present case.

4. In














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