LODHA, J.—The suit out of which these two connected appeals arise was instituted by the plaintiffs Gopinath, Ramprasad and Mangilal against the defendants Ramjilal, Smt. Durga Devi and Surajnarain under sec. 92 C.P.C. after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate Genera! of Rajasthan. Subsequently Sunder Lal was also added as defendant No. 4. The plaintiffs claim that defendant No. 1 Ramjilal, defendant No. 3 Surajnarain and defendant No. 4 Sunderlal be removed as trustees in respect of Bagichi and Dharamshala situated in the Gangapur city, District Sawai Madhopur, and other suitable persons be appointed as trustees. Another prayer contained in the plaint was that the gift deed dated 4-7-53 executed in favour of defendant No. 2 Durga Devi by defendant No. 1 Ramjilal in respect of property marked as No. 2 in the site plan Ex. X alleged to be a part of the trust property be declared void and ineffective. Lastly it was prayed that if defendant No. 3 Surajnarain is found to be in possession of any part of the alleged trust property, he may be dispossessed and the possession of the same be handed over to the trustees who may be appointed afresh.

2. Plaintiff No. 2 Ramprasad died during the pendency of the suit and his name was struck off. Defendant No. 1 Ramjilal also died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court before the learned single Judge and his legal representatives were brought on the record. Plaintiff No. 1 Gopinath too died on 27-1*62 during the pendency of the appeal before the learned single Judge. His name was struck off. Thus there remained only one plaintiff appellant Mangilal and an abjection was raised on behalf of the defendants who had succeeded in the trial court that the appeal by Mangilal alone was not maintainable. This objection was over-ruled and the appeal was allowed on merits.

3. In this special appeal u/sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, an objection has again been raised by the defendant appellants that the plain-tiff Mangilal alone could not have continued the appeal. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the language of sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that the suit may be instituted either by the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust. It is argued that Mangilal alone could not maintain the appeal. This point, in our opinion, has no substance. In this connection reference may be made to the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ali Begam vs. Badr-ul-Islam Ali Khan(l) :

"There is no provision whatever in the Code (C. P. C.) for recourse being had to the Advocate-General or Collector during the course of a suit or of any proceedings in appeal. As sub-sec. (2) of sec. 92 sufficiently shows, the consent in writing is a condition of the valid institution of a suit and has no relevance to any other stage. When once validly instituted it is a representative suit subject to all the incidents affecting suits in general and representative suits in particular. Their Lordships cannot accept the doctrine of Jailal J., in the present case that the persons who have instituted the suit with the leave of the Collector are to be deemed to be one plaintiff, nor do they see any reason why one of several plaintiffs in such a suit should not appeal on the same and conditions as are applicable to suits in general."

This point again arose before the Supreme Court in Harnam Singh vs. Gurdial Singh(2). In that case the suit was brought by two plaintiffs after obtaining permission from the Advocate General. One of the plaintiff-respondents died and his legal representatives were not brought on the record. However in view of the nature of the suit, no objection was raised before their Lordships about the maintainability of the appeal on that ground.

4. Thus in view of the clear pronouncement of the Privy Council in Ali Begams case (supra) we are of the opinion that one of the plaintiffs namely Mangi Lal could maintai

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