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1973 Supreme(Raj) 80

Rajasthan High Court
Kan Singh, J.
Umrao Mal - Appellant
Versus
Heera Lal - Respondents
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 116 of 1973
Decided On : April 05, 1973

Advocates Appeared:
C.L. Agarwal & L.M. Lodha, for Appellant; D.P. Gupta & S.K. Keshote, for Respondent

Headnote:(a) Transfer of Property Act, Sec. 106—Manufacturing purpose—Grinding of grain into floor is manufacturing process.(b) Transfer of Properly Act, Sec. 106—Letting out premises for multipurpose use—Court will have to find as to what was the dominant purpose — Where manufacturing purpose was carried in small part of a big area held that manufacturing purpose was not dominant.

       The second question is whether the grinding of grain or corn into flour by a mechanical process would result in the manufacturing of the flour as such. There is no transformation so far as the chemical composition of the grain is concerned when it is turned into flour. One may not find any significant change in the properties of the goods either but from the point of view of trade and commerce the commodity is understood in a different sense, that is, what is flour is not grain and vice versa. Though flour is no doubt a derivative of food-grains yet grain and flour are commercially different and distinct commodities. Therefore, when on account of the mechanical process the grain is ground into flour, it would he "manufacture" within the meaning of sec. 106 of the T.P. Act. (Para 24)

       Held = The purpose as a result of the subsequent behaviour of the parties turned out to be (1) establishment of a flour mill which is a manufacturing purpose, (2) putting up of a chaff cutting machine which is a non-manufacturing purpose and (3) for residential purposes. The flour mill is in a tin shed separated from the main house. The Nohra is quite a big one, 141 ft. 3 inches East-West and 161 ft. 3 inches North-South. The flour mill occupies a very small area out of this big Nohra let out to the defendant. Taking the overall effect of all the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the defendant has been able to establish that the dominant purpose of the lease was a manufacturing one. It is mixed up with other purposes and when it is a case of the lease being taken for multi-purposes, i.e. when several purposes are mixed up it will have to be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case as to which of the several purposes was the dominant purpose. In the present case the lease cannot be said to be one which falls under the first part of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Paras 24 and 25)

KAN SINGH, J.—This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from certain premises known as a Nohra situated in the town of Alwar.

2. According to the plaintiff respondent the suit Nohra including the constructions thereon originally belonged to the State of Rajasthan. The premises were let out to the defendant-appellant for residence for a period of ten years, on a monthly rent of Rs. 14.50. On 15th April, 1964 the suit premises were purchased by the plaintiff. Thereafter he served the tenant with a notice on 6th June, 1966 and terminated the tenancy. The plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment, inter alia, on the ground of bona fide reasonable necessity. He averred that he wanted to construct a godown and also was desirous of putting up a mill for the manufacture of sugar, oil and dal. It was also averred that the defendant tenant had cut certain trees standing on the premises and thus damaged the property. The decree of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 43 50 was also prayed for.

3. The defendant contested the suit. It was admitted that the suit Nohra originally belonged to the State of Rajasthan and the same had been subsequently sold to the plaintiff. It was also admitted that the premises were let out by the State to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 14-50. It was, however, asserted that the premises bad been let out to the defendant for a manufacturing purpose and the defendant had put up a chaff-cutting machine on the land. It was denied that the plaintiff wanted the suit premises for his bona fide personal necessity. The cutting of the trees was also denied. The receipt of notice for termination of the tenancy was admitted but it was stated that notice was not valid, in that, a six-month notice for terminating the lease was required to be given. According to the defendant the plaintiff had an ulterior motive in seeking the ejectment of the defendant as he wanted to enhance the rent.

4. The learned Addition Munsiff Magistrate No. 2, Alwar before whom the suit was filed framed a number of issues. He held that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his bonafide reasonable necessity. He however did not accept the plaintiffs plea that the defendant had materially damaged the premises. Further, he held the notice for termination of tenancy to be valid. In the result he decreed the plaintiffs suit for ejectment.

5. Aggrieved by the decree of the learned Additional Munsif Magistrate the defendant went in appeal to the court of the Additional District Judge, Alwar but without any success.

6. It is in these circumstances that the defendant tenant has come in second appeal to this Court.

7. The appeal was admitted on 22nd February, 1973. The notice for the stay application was also issued. The stay application came up for orders on 9th March, 1973. Since there was only one contention as to whether the notice that was issued for terminating the tenancy was valid in the circumstances of the case, on the request of the parties both the stay application and the appeal were ordered to be taken up together.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the dominant purpose of the lease was manufacturing one. According to sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, six months notice was,therefore, required to be given to the tenant for terminating the lease.

9. The learned counsel for the respondent contests the stand. He raises a two-fold contention. Firstly, according to him the tenancy being for a fixed period of ten years and the period having expired long back in 1960, no notice was required to be given for terminating the lease as the defendant was continuing on the premises as a statutory tenant on account of the protection under sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as the Act). In the second place it was argued that the lease was, if at all, both for residential as well as manufacturing purposes and in such a case the tenancy could be ta


























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