Rajasthan High Court
Kan Singh, J.
Gulam Abbas - Appellant
Versus
Shri Kalyan Finance Co., Ajmer - Respondents
S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 26 of 1971
Decided On : January 21, 1975
Unlike O. 7, R. 11(c) C.P.C. where the Court is bound to grant some time to supply the deficient court fee there is no such obligation on the Court to grant time for making good the deficiency in court fee on a memorandum of appeal. Therefore, in such a case the Court has a discretion under sec. 149 C. P. C. to allow court fee to be paid at any stage. The discretion being judicial has to be exercised like any other judicial discretion. The discretion cannot be exercised in favour of the party who has not acted bona fide or was not under any honest mistake or doubt. It is also evident that the word "bona fide" or "good faith" has to be taken in the sense contemplated by the General Clauses Act and not as under the Limitation Act.
Held = A party who had been negligent is not entitled to the exercise of the Courts discretion in his favour Nevertheless the Court has to take note of frailities of human mind Where the Court is satisfied that there has been a mistake not attributable to any mala fides, the Court may be justified in condoning the delay on reasonable terms. The discretion vested u/sec. 149, C P. C. is normally expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant except in cases of contumacy or positive mala fides or reasons of a similar kind. The question is one of exercise discretion on sound principle and where the Court is exercising its discretion in favour of a party under sec. 149 C. P. C. it is not thereby depriving the opposite party of any of the vested right. ( paras 7 and 10)
The appellant filed the appeal on 2-1 71 against the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer dated 27-7-70. The Office found that the appeal was filed within time, but it noticed that the certified copies of the judgment and decree did not bear court fee stamp; the court fee stamps requited being of Re. 1/- and Rs. 1 50 paise respectively. The case was ordered to be put up on 12-2-71, but as the deficiency of court fee was not made good the case was ordered to be put up on 10-3-71. On 10-3-71, Shri Dalpat Raj, one of the counsel for the appellant, was present, but as the defects had not been removed the case was ordered to be put up before the Registrar on 5-4-71. Before this date, however, the deficiency of Rs. 2.50 paise in court fee was made good and accordingly the case was ordered to be listed for admission in court. On 28-4-71 the appeal came up for admission before Bhargava J. who admitted the same and ordered the issue of notices to the respondents. The appeal remained in the Office for the service of the respondents and was eventually listed for hearing in court on 12-9-73 before Modi J. who ordered that it be put up before another Bench. Accordingly the appeal was put up before me on 8-10-73. It was adjourned at the request of the learned counsel for the respondents. Eventually for one reason or the other the appeal was not heard by me till 5-12-74. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection on this date that the appeal was barred by time inasmuch as the deficiency in the court fee to the extent of Rs. 2.50 paise was made good after the period of limitation had expired. Learned counsel for the respondents emphasised that not only there had been no application for condonation of delay, but there was no sufficient cause either for condoning the delay. He invited attention to Jai Bhagwan vs. Om Prakash(l) in support of his preliminary objection. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for an adjournment to meet this objection. The case was, therefore, adjourned.
2. It was in the above circumstances that the present application under sec. 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure came to be moved.
3 Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed this application. He submits that the delay in filing the deficit court fee should not be condoned. The appellant, according to him, had not shown sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay. Attention of the learned counsel was drawn to the defects pointed out by the Office as back as on 10-3-71 when Shri Dalpat Raj was present.
4. The arguments on either side have travelled far and wide. The gist of submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is that the Court had admitted the appeal and, therefore, by implication it has condoned the delay. There was further bona fide mistake on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant & the Court should be liberal in condoning such delay. No right can be said to have been vested in the respondents in such a case where delay is to be condoned u/s. 149 of the C.P.C. The term, "good faith" while applying S. 149 C.P.C. has to be construed according to the General Clauses Act and not according to the Limitation Act. Learned counsel for the appellant, referred me to Amar Singh vs. Chaturbhuj (2), Jagatram vs. Kharaitiram(3), Custodian Evacuee Property vs. Rameshwar Dayal(4), Ganesh Prasad vs. Narendra Nath(5), Jagannath vs. Ram Dularey(6) and Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan (7).
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the case of there being bona fide mistake on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant
(12) Basawwa vs. Limbawwa ( AIR 1968 Bom 309 )
(8) Shakuntala Devi vs. Kuntal Kumari ( AIR 1969 SC 575 )
(13; Mahant Ram Das vs. Ganga Das ( AIR 1961 SC 882 )
(17) M.L. Sethi vs. R. P. Kapur ( AIR 1972 SC 2379 )
(18) Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. ( AIR 1962 SC 361 )
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.