SACHAR, J. (ORAL)—Whether an amendment made by incorporating sub-sec. (3) in sec. 14 of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent an Eviction) Act, hereinafter to be called "she Act", by means of Ordinance 26 of 1975 as replaced by Amendment Act 14 of 1976 will apply to suits for eviction which had been filed before the coming into force of the said amendment is the question that calls for decision in the present revision petition.

2. Section 13(1) (h) of the Act provides that no court shall pass any decree, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant unless it is satisfied that the premises are required reasonably any bonafide by the landlord for the puspeses mentioned therein. This provision applies equally to premises let out for residential as well as commercial or business purposes.

3. On 30-3-72 the premises in dispute were let out to the petitioner-tenant. On 7-2-75 the respondent-landlord filed a suit under sec. 13(l)(h) of the Act on the allegation that he required the premises for his own personal bona fide use. It is common ground that the premises were let out for commercial and business purposes. During the pendency of the suit the Act was amended by Act No. 14/76 and subclause (3) was added in sec. 14 of the Act which is as under:—

"14(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law of contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises let out to the tenant."

4. As admittedly the lettering out of the premises in dispute was within a period of 5 years from the filing of the suit the petitioner raised an objection before the trial court that the suit was not maintainable because of the amendment made by the Act No 14/76. This plea has been negatived by the trial court by its order of 14-8-76 by which it has held that there is no bar to the maintenance of the suit as the amendment is not applicable to pending suit. Aggrieved against that the petitioner has filed this revision to this court.

5. The suit has still to be decided on merits. The petitioner tenant is not accepting the allegation that the respondent-landlord requires the premises bona-fide for his personal use. In view of the fact that the suit is still pending, normally I might have been disinclined to entertain the revision petition as, according to me, it is doubtful whether a revision would lie at the interlocutory stage. But I am told that a number of similar petitions have already been admitted in this Court. Not only that, I am given to understand by the counsel for the parties that identical objections are being raised in the lower courts in a number of pending suits. In that view of the matter as this point raises undoubtedly a matter of interpretation and could have relevancy to a large number of pending matters, I thought it fit to hear arguments on merits so that the decision as to the effect of Sec. 14(3) of the Act could be given by this Court.

6. The controversy lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner tenants case being that even it a suit had been filed earlier to the incorporation of sec. 14(3) the suit cannot continue as 5 years period admittedly has not expired from the date of the letting of the premises. The counsel for the respondent however maintains that the said amendment is prospective and will only apply to the suits which are filed after the amendment was brought into farce i.e. from the commencement of the Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 (which came into force on 29-9-75) and which Ordinance was later on replaced by the Amendment Act No. 14/76. It is well settled that though the legislature is undoubtedly competent to take away vested rights by means of retrospective legislation, yet unless a clear and unambiguous intention is indicated by the legislature by adopting suitable express words in that

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