1. Dispute over land sold by a limited owner — claim for possession by reversioners based on lack of legal necessity under Hindu Law. (Para 1 )
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1964 Supreme(SC) 206
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.
Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representatives Kasibai and others, Appellants
Versus
Mahadu and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 406 of 1962.
Advocate appeared
Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate (Mr. R. Ganapathy Iyer, Advocate, with him), for Appellants; M/s. B. R. L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, Advocates, for Respondents Nos, 1 to 4.
Advocates:
B.R.L.Iyengar, G.S.PATHAK, K.L.Mehta, R.Ganapathy Iyer, S.K.MEHTA
B.R.L.Iyengar, G.S.PATHAK, K.L.Mehta, R.Ganapathy Iyer, S.K.MEHTA
A vested right of appeal is a substantive right governed by the law prevailing at the time of the suit's commencement. It is not lost through subsequent procedural changes unless expressly provided by the new legislation or by necessary intendment.
Headnote:(A) Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code (Act 31 of 1328 Fasli) - Section 602 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - Right of appeal - Vested right of appeal is a substantive right and is governed by the law prevailing at the time of commencement of the suit, comprising all successive rights of appeal from court to court which constitute one proceeding - Such a right may be taken away by a subsequent enactment expressly or by necessary intendment - Alterations in the law of procedure are generally retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law unless provision is made expressly in that behalf or a necessary implication arises. (Paras 3, 4, 5)
(B) Constitution of India - Article 136 - Scope of interference - In an appeal with special leave, the court will not ordinarily discard the findings of the High Court on what is essentially a question of fact, provided the court was competent under the law governing the appeal to arrive at such findings. (Para 6)
Facts of the case:
A limited owner sold lands to a vendee. The heirs of the limited owner's daughter later sued for possession, claiming the sale lacked legal necessity and that they were the nearest reversioners. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the First Appellate Court reversed it, and the High Court subsequently restored the Trial Court's decree, finding no legal necessity and concluding that the daughter had predeceased the limited owner. The appellants challenged the High Court's jurisdiction to review findings of fact in a second appeal, arguing that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which restricts second appeals to questions of law, should apply.
Findings of Court:
The High Court's jurisdiction was derived from the local procedural code in force at the time the suit was instituted, which allowed second appeals on both questions of fact and law. The subsequent extension of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, did not retrospectively restrict this jurisdiction for suits already pending or instituted under the previous law.
Issues: Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to set aside findings of fact in a second appeal despite the subsequent application of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the findings of fact regarding the survival of the daughter were sustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A vested right of appeal is a substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the suit. Such a right is not extinguished by a subsequent change in procedural law unless the new law expressly provides for it or it is a necessary implication.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
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Table of Contents
2. Whether the sale was for legal necessity, whether the daughter survived the limited owner, and whether the High Court could review findings of fact in second appeal. (Para 1 , 3 )
3. Vested rights of appeal are substantive and governed by the law at suit commencement, remaining unaffected by subsequent procedural changes unless expressly repealed. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 )
4. A vested right of appeal is a substantive right; subsequent procedural laws do not retrospectively restrict appellate jurisdiction unless expressly provided or necessarily implied. (Para 4 , 5 )
5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 7 )
6. Does a change in procedural law retrospectively affect a vested right of appeal?
No. A right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by an alteration in the law of procedure unless provision is made expressly in that behalf or a necessary implication arises. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 )
7. How is a vested right of appeal defined and governed?
A vested right of appeal is a substantive right governed by the law prevailing at the time of the commencement of the suit, comprising all successive rights of appeal from court to court. (Para 4 )
8. Does the Supreme Court interfere with factual findings of the High Court under Article 136?
The Supreme Court will not ordinarily discard the findings of the High Court on what is essentially a question of fact, provided the High Court was competent under the law to arrive at such findings. (Para 6 )
Judgment
SHAH, J. :-
This appeal relates to lands which originally belonged to one Beli Ram son of Ananda. Beli Ram died leaving him surviving his wife Rukhma Bai and his daughter Vitha Bai, and on his death his property devolved upon Rukhma Bai as a limited owner. By a deed dated July 26, 1916 Rukhma Bai sold the lands to one Mukund Deo for Rs. 600/- (O.S.) and delivered possession of the lands to the vendee. Rukhma Bai died in 1940. The respondents to this appeal who were the sons of Vitha Bai commenced on February 21, 1944 an action against the transferee Mukund Deo in the court of the Munsiff, Mominabad Taluk, for a decree for possession of the lands sold by Rukhma Bai. They alleged in their plaint that they were governed by the Mayukha school of Hindu Law, that the sale of the lands by Rukhma Bai was not supported by legal necessity and that on the death of Rukhma Bai they became entitled to the lands as the nearest reversioners to the estate of Beli Ram. Mukund Deo contested the claim contending, inter alia, that the sale by Rukhma Bai was for legal necessity, that Vitha Bai had survived Rukhma Bai and that Vitha Bai had during her lifetime assented to the alienation and had thereafter filed a suit for declaration, that the sale was not binding upon her but had withdrawn the same after entering into a compromise with Mukund Deo, admitting his title to the lands. The Trial Court reflected the contentions noised by Mukund Deo. The Court held that the sale was not for purposes of legal necessity, that Vitha Bai had predeceased Rukhma Bai, and that the plaintiffs as the nearest reversioners to the estate of Beli Ram on the death of Rukhma Bai were entitled to a decree for possession claimed. In appeal to the Additional Sub-Judge, Mominabad the decree of the Trial Court was reversed. The learned Appellate Judge held that the sale was supported by legal necessity and that in any event as Vitha Bai had during the lifetime of Rukhma Bai attempted to impeach the alienation in favour of Mukund Deo, and had thereafter entered into a compromise admitting Mukund Deo s title and acknowledging the validity of the sale, the plaintiffs who could only claim as heirs to Vitha Bai who had survived. her mother Rukhma Bai had no valid claim to the lands.
2. In second appeal No. 544 of 1947 the High Court of Hyderabad by judgment dated July 17, 1953 reversed the decree of the First Appellate Court and restored the decree sale the Trial Court. In the view of the High Court, Mukund Deo failed to establish that the sale was for legal necessity. The High Court also held that the conduct of. Vitha Bai in entering into a compromise and withdrawing her declaratory suit could not confer a valid title on Mukund Deo. They further held that the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs that Vitha Bai had predeceased Rukhma Bai was "preferable" to the evidence lad by the defendant Mukund Deo. With special leave, the heirs and the legal representatives of Mukund Deo who died since the decree of the High Court have preferred this appeal.
3. The High Court disagreed with the view of the First Appellate Court on the question whether the sale to Mukund Deo was supported by legal necessity and also on the question whether Vitha Bai had predeceased Rukhma Bai, Counsel for the appellants argued that the High Court had, in second appeal, no jurisdiction to set aside the finding of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court. In so arguing, counsel assumed that the jurisdiction of the High Court in deciding the second appeal before it was derived from S. 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. That assumption is, however, not true. When the suit was filed the lands in dispute were situate within the territory of H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and the suit filed by the respondents had to be heard and disposed of according to the relevant provisions of the code of Cevil Procedure in force in the State of Hyderabad. The Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code (Act 31 of 1328 Fasli)
