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1980 Supreme(Raj) 166

Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench
Mahendra Bhushan, J.
Panchayat Shri Digambar Jain Mandir Parshwanathji - Appellant
Versus
Shri Vishnu Prasad - Respondents
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 40 of 1969
Decided On : December 23, 1980

Advocates Appeared:
R.C. Kasliwal, for Appellant; P.N. Dutt & Mr. K.N. Tikku, for Respondent.

Headnote:(a) Rent Control—Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act—Sec. 13—In suits for eviction on any of the grounds under Sec. 13, notice to determine tenancy is not necessary.(b) Transfer of Property Act—Sec. 106—In suits for eviction on any of the grounds under Sec. 13(i) of the Raj. Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, notice to determine the tenancy is not necessary.(c) Will—Construction under will—Income of the property is to be spent over the worship of temple. Held, in the circumstances, that the corpus (property) is also given and dedication in favour of temple is absolute.(d) Rent Control Rent Control Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act-Sec. 3(iii)—Landlord—Receipt of rent or right to receive rent is important factor to make the person landlord under the Act. Element of ownership is not necessary characteristic.

       Their Lordships also considered Sambhu for eviction on any of the grounds under Ram vs. Mangal Singh (2) wherein this s. 13(1) of the Act, to my mind, it is not court had taken a view that a notice under necessary to determine the tenancy by sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act giving a notice under sec. 106(i) the Trans-was necessary. Therefore, to my mind, fer of Property Act. I will like to add the observations of their lordships of the that even if valid notice under sec. 106 of Supreme Court in Chettiars case (supra), the Transfer of Property Act is given, the extracted above, leave no manner of doubt suit still cannot be decreed unless a ground that their lordships intended to lay down for eviction is set out under the various the law also so far as the eviction cases clauses of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act under the Act are concerned, and in suits in made out. (Para 9)

       The right to recover rent, which vested in Prabhulal and to apply it over the worship of the Mandir and the other temple at Govindgarh was given to the Panchayat Digambar Jain (Plaintiff-appellant). Under sec. 3(iii) of the Act, landlord means any person, who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver or any other person who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. Thus, according to the definition of the landlord, as given in sec. 3(iii) of the Act, the element of ownership of the premises is not the main characteristic of a landlord, but it is the receipt of rent or a right to receive the rent by a person, it is the important factor. Lalita Prasad, the original tenant, who is now represented by the respondents, who are the legal representatives, was a tenant of Kishanlal. After the death of Kishanlal, his adopted son Prabhulal received the rent of the disputed premise from Lalita Prasad, as under the Will the (Ex.l3) also he had been given a right to recover rent and utilise the same over the worship of the Mandir and the other temple at Govindgarh, and also over the maintenance of the property described in para 3 of the planit. Prabhulal gave the right to recover rent to Panchayat Digambar Jain, and as such Panchayat Digambar Jain had a right to recover rent from Lalita Prasad, the original tenant, and his legal representatives. Therefore, the Panchayat Digambar Jain is a landlord within the meaning of s. 3(iii) of the Act. Even if the Panchayat Digambar Jain may be said to be recovering rent on behalf of the Mandir it will still be landlord within the meaning of sec. 3(iii) of the Act, so far as the premises in dispute are concerned. The use of the words "any person" in sec. 3(iii) of the Act will make it clear that it is not only the owner of the building but any person who received or has a right to receive the rent,, who is landlord for the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the suit for eviction by Panchayat Digambar Jain to my mind is maintainable. (Para 13)

MAHENDRA BHUSHAN, J — This is a Civil Second appeal by the plaintiff in an eviction suit, which was decreed by the learned trial court, but the first appeal of the defendant respondents, legal representatives of the original tenant Lalita Prasad was allowed and the suit was dismissed.

2. The suit property, which is described in para 8 of the plaint and is part of house bearing Municipal No. 762, described in para 3 of the plaint, is situated in Rasta Dariba-Pan, Chowkri Ramchandraji. One Kishanlal Pandya son of Ganeshlal Pandya was the owner of the house described in para 3 of the plaint. Under a registered will dated i 1.9.42, the said Kishanlal Pandya beque-sthed the entire rental income of the house for the worship of Mandir Shri Vijay Ramji Pandya situated at Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the Mandir), and directed his adopted son Prabhulal to recover the income and to spend it over the worship of the aforesaid Mandir and one temple situated at Govind- garh. It was also directed under the Will (Ex.13) that the rental income from the house was also to be utilised in doing necessary maintenance of the house. The appellant Panchayat Shri Digambar Jain Mandir Parshwanathji (soniyan), Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat Jain Mandir) is a registered society under the Rajasthan Society Registration Act. Prabhulal adopted son of Kishanlal and other managers of the Mandir gave the management of the Mandir to Panchayat Digambar Jain under their letter dated May 22, 1957, and the Panchayat Digambar Jain in its meeting dt. 28.7.57 accepted the same. Thereafter, under a registered gift deed dated 21.3.59 (Ex. 3) Prabhulal adopted son of Kishanlal Pandya gave the suit house to the Mandir and the gift was accepted by the Secretary of Panchayat Digambar Jain under whom the administration of the Mandir had already vested.

3. Panchayat Digambar Jain filed a suit for eviction against Lalita Prasad, the original tenant, interalia on the grounds that the suit house was required reasonably and bona fide by it for running a school Gyan Bal Niketan Sanstha (in short Bal Niketan), that the tenant has committed defaults in paying the rent. The suit was contested by Lalita Prasad, who, in the written statement, raised various pleas including a plea that Prabhulal was not the adopted son of Kishanlal and that he had no right to transfer in any manner the property vesting in the Mandir; that the suit house was not reasonably and bona fide required to run Bal Niketan; that he had spent a sum of Rs.87/- over the repairs of the suit house with the permission of the landlord. The learned trial court on the pleadings of the parties framed as many as 5 issues and after trial decreed the suit for eviction. Lalita Prasad filed an appeal in the court of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, and the appeal was later on transferred to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, (1), Jaipur City, who, under his judgment and decree dated 31.7.68, allowed the appeal only on the ground that the notice terminating the tenancy of Lalita Prasad was invalid. It may be stated here that during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Lalita Prasad died, and his legal representatives, the respondents, were brought on record. Panchayat Digambar Jain filed a second appeal in this court and during the pendency of the appeal the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) amended by Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 came into force with effect from 29.9 75, and was later on replaced by an Act. As the suit was based on default, and an application under section 13- A of the Act for determination of the arrears of rent etc. within 90 days of the coming into force of the Ordinance had been filed, and because the suit was also based on reasonable and bona fide necessity, in view of the provisions of section 14(2) of the Act, this court vide its order dated April 1, 1976 framed an additional iss

















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