K.S. LODHA, J.— This is a misc. appeal by the judgment-debtor against the order of the learned District Judge, Dungarpur dated 16. 12. 83, dismissing his objections to the execution of a decree for specific performance of contract.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length.

3. The only objection of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the decree for specific performance of the contract did not provide for delivery of possession of the property, the executing court was wrong in holding that in execution of such a decree the executing court can deliver possession to the decree-holder as the relief of possession is implied in a decree for specific performance of the contract. He has divided his arguments in two limbs. The first limb of the argument is that in the suit the plaintiff had specifically prayed for grant of possession but the trial court did not grant the relief of possession and, therefore, under section 11 C.P.C. such a relief must be deemed to have been refused. That being so the executing court could not have granted such a relief. The second limb of the argument is that if at all the plaintiff decree-holder wanted to get the relief of possession in the present suit or the executing proceedings, he should have got the plaint amended and asked for the relief of possession as required by section 22 of the Specific Relief Act.

4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I do not find any substance in either of the contentions. So far as the first limb of the argument is concerned which is based on explanation 5 to section 11 C.P.C. It may at once be stated that this explanation can apply only to a relief which is independent of the relief which has already been granted by the court because if the relief which is implied in a relief which has already been granted by the court, a specific mention of that relief in the decree may not be strictly necessary. However, if the additional relief sought is independent of the main relief already granted by the court then the explanation will have its effect and such a relief will be deemed to have been refused by the court. The matter would be clear from a reference to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babu Lal vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (1) to which I will refer in a little detail while discussing the other limb of the argument.

5. Now coming to the other limb, it may again be at once stated that the contention is ill founded inasmuch as there cannot be any reason or justification for the plaintiff asking for an amendment of the plaint when the relief of possession had already been prayed for and as stated above, must be deemed to have been impliedly granted when the decree for specific performance of the contract has been passed. The matter stands concluded by their Lordships deciding in the aforesaid case of Babu Lal. It is pertinent to note that before the provisions of section 22 of the Specific Relief Act as amended in 1963 came into force the settled view was that a decree for specific performance of the contract implied a relief for possession also. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to all the cases which have taken this view and then they have referred to the amended section 22 of the Specific Relief Act in 1963. Their Lordships observed that "section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The Legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance, even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when suit for specific performance is decreed. The legislature has now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the Court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execu

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