Honble KOKJE, J. – Heard Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari on admission.

(2). This is a petition challenging an Order allowing an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as `the Code) filed by the plaintiff proposing an amendment in the plaint adding new ground of eviction or the basis of need of the Grand son of plaintiff No. 1 and son of plaintiff No. 2 who had come of age during the pendency of the suit.

(3). The amendment was opposed by the defendant-petitioner on the ground that the nature of the suit would be changed by the amendment as originally the suit was only on the ground of default of payment of rent. It was also contended that instead of filing a fresh suit, the original cause of action itself was being substituted by a different cause of action.

(4). Normally, such revision petitions against allowing an amendment in the plaint are disposed of by passing a short Order that it is within the jurisdiction of the trial Court to allow or not to allow an amendment application and the discretion exercised by the trial Court is not normally interfered with. However, as the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a legal point, I am passing this Order in detail.

(5). The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that such amendments were being allowed on the basis of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chand (1), which needs reconsideration in the light of a later decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal (2).

(6). It is seriously contended that the very basis of the Division Bench decision in Prem Lals case was that the grounds of eviction set out under Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short `the Act hereinafter), do not constitute a necessary part of cause of action for eviction and the original cause of action was the determination of jural relationship between the landlord and tenant by serving notice of termination of tenancy. This according to the learned counsel needs to be reconsidered in the light of the V. Dhanapals case (supra), which holds that notice of termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary in a suit for eviction from the tena- ncy premises to which Rent Act applies.

(7). To appreciate the correct legal position, the ratio - decidendi of Prem Lals case (supra) as well as V. Chanapals case (supra) has to be taken into account.

(8). Prem Pals case went before the Division Bench on a reference doubting the correctness the decision of Jagat Narain, J., in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari (3) and reiterated by him in Kedarnath vs. Pana Devi (4), holding that an application by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce a new ground of eviction viz. on the ground of default based on clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, cannot be allowed under Section 153 or Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where such ground arises after the institution of a suit for the eviction of the defendant on one or more of the grounds set forth in Section 13(1) of the Act, inasmuch as that would be tantamount to allowing the plaintiff to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the decision.

(9). In Rajeshwar Dayal and Kedarnaths cases (supra), the learned single Jud- ge had proceeded on the assumption that the existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act constitutes a necessary part of the cause of action for eviction of a tenant for accommodation and therefore where such a ground after institution of the suit on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to amend the plaint to introduce such a ground/s. The learned single Judge had held that the Court had no power either under Section 153 or under Order 6 Rule 17 of t

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