Honble CHAUHAN, J.–In these petitions, the common questions of facts and law are involved and the common impugned order dated 18.10.2000 passed by the Superintending Engineer, respondent No.2, is under challenge. By the said impugned order, respondent No.2 has passed certain directions to respondent No.1 to re-adjust/remodel certain outlets.

(2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are that in all these petitions, petitioners are the agriculture tenure-holders having irrigation facilities and they are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 18.10.2000. The writ petitions have been filed on the grounds that under the garb of issuing the rectification orders, the Appellate Authority has interferred with the irrigation outlets and the order stands vitiated for the reason that he is the Appellate Authority under the Act and the same could not have been passed by him as it deprived the petitioners from the right of appeal. It has further been contended that no notice under Rule 11 of the Rajasthan Drainage Rules, 1957 (for short, ``the Rules, 1957) had been given to the petitioners.

(3). On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that it is only rectification, re-fixation, re- designing or re-adjusting the outlets to repair them properly as during the course of time, the same resulted in deviation and the same are discharging more or lesser quantity of water than as it should be as per their original respective designs. Thus, it is not an order which is likely to adversely affect the petitioners and for doing so, no notice under Rule 11(3) of the Rules, 1957 is required. Petitions are liable to be dismissed.

(4). It is settled proposition of law that when Statute confers power on a particular Authority or person to perform certain functions, it cannot be exercised by any other person. (Vide Toda Ram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1); Karan Singhji Jadeja & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2); State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Ram Naresh Lal (3); Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguli & Anr. (4); Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta (5); Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India & Anr. (6) and Chandrika Jha vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (7).

(5). In Purtabpur Company Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar (8), the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:

``The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6(1) is statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power, he cannot obligate his responsibilities in favour of any one; not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interferred with the functions of the Cane Commissioner ...... The Executive Officers, entrusted with statutory discretion, may, in some cases, be obliged to make into account consideration of public policy and in some context the policy of a Minister or the Government as the whole when it is relevant factor in weighing the policy but this will not absolve them from the duty to exercise the personal judgment in individual case unless explicit statutory provisions have been made for them to be given binding instructions by a superior.

(6). Similar view has been reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in Jarnail Singh vs. The Superintending Engineer & Ors. (9).

(7). A Division Bench of this court in Baga Ram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (10), interpreted the provisions of Rule 11 (2) and (3) of the Rules, 1957, observing as under:

``In this connection, we may also point out that the S.I.O. by converting himself into an original authority has deprived the aggrieved party of a right of appeal. The argument that because the S.I.O. is the appellate authority to whom the case would have ultimately come and, therefore, his orders, passed even though as an original authority, are valid, is in our opinion, not tenable. The Rules on the subject are quite clear tha

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