Honble SINGH, CJ.–This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 6.12.1995 in S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 1989. The facts lie in a narrow compass.

(2). The appellant Gopal Lal and respondents Babu Lal, Moda Ram and Kishan Lal are sons of Tola Ram. The first respondent Babu Lal instituted a partition suit, being Civil Original Suit No. 28 of 1980, in the Court of District Judge, Bikaner against the appellant and the second and third respondents. A compromise was entered into by and between the parties and consequently, a compromise decree was drawn by the trial Court on 31.10.1981. It is significant to note the several years later, the appellant filed a civil suit, being Civil Original Suit No. 49 of 1987 for declaring the compromise decree to be vitiated by fraud. The respondents herein in the written-statement, inter alia pleaded that the suit was barred in view of the provision of Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court struck number of issues including issue No.4 relating to the maintainability of the suit in view of Order 23 Rule 3A. C.P.C., 1908. The issue was decided in favour of the respondents and the suit of the appellant was dismissed.

(3). Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit by the trial court the appellant filed S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 1989. The learned Single Judge affirming the order of the trial court, dismissed the appeal by his judgment and order dated December 6, 1995 on the ground that a party to a compromise decree can question the same only by filing a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, C.P.C. before the trial Court decreeing the suit or by means of an appeal under Section 96 (1), C.P.C.; but, he cannot file a suit to set aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful. Not satisfied, the appellant has filed the instant special appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge dated December 6, 1995.

(4). We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

(5). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the compromise was arrived at by practicing fraud on the appellant. According to him, the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge were not right in holding that no suit could be filed to set aside the compromise decree. He contended the where a compromise decree is obtained by exercising fraud on a party the same can be challenged by means of a civil suit.

(6). On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that Rule 3A of Order 23, C.P.C. bars a suit to set aside a compromise decree.

(7). We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

(8). Rule 3A was added to Order 23, C.P.C. by Act No. 104 of 1976. The amendment was introduced with a view to prevent challenge to compromise decrees by means of civil suits as the courts were burdened with suits challenging compromise decrees on one ground or the other. This also resulted in burdening the judicial system with appeals. Besides it led to delay in resolution of the disputes.

(9). At this stage we may notice Rule 3 A of Order 23, C.P.C. which reads as follows:

``Bar to suit-No suit shall to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.

(10). The words ``not lawful are of a wide amplitude and include all sorts of illegalities.

(11). A compromise between the parties is nothing but an agreement. According to Section 23 of the contract Act 1872, the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provision of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

(12). In other words, the object or condition of a contract is unlawful or not lawful in the following contingencies:

1. It is forbidden by law;

2. It defeats

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