2009 Supreme(Raj) 1260
[Citation : RLW 2010(1) RJ 90 (HC)]
(Rajasthan High Court)
LRs of late Ujagar Singh & Anr. Vs. Shri Kartar Singh (Vyas, J.)
HON'BLE GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS, J.
LRs of late Ujagar Singh & Anr.
Versus
Shri Kartar Singh
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 223 of 2009, decided on 11.11.2009
C.S. Kotwani, for Petitioners;
Sanjeet Purohit, for Respondent
Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 136 — Limitation period for execution proceedings initiated by decree holder — Held — Under Art. 136 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for execution of the decree is 12 years — Such period commences from the date when the decree becomes enforceable — Decree become enforceable for the purpose of execution when the petitioner obtained sanad — When the decree in question is specific with regard to enforceability, then the date of passing of the decree cannot be considered for commencement of the time of limitation.
Revision dismissed. (Paras 15 & 16)
ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963] vuqPNsn 136 & fMØh /kkjh }kjk lafLFkr dh xbZ fu"iknu dh dk;Zokgh gsrq ifjlhek vof/k & vfHkfu/kkZfjr & ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds vuqPNsn 136 ds rgr fMØh ds fu"iknu gsrq ifjlhek dh vof/k 12 o"kZ fu/kkZfjr gS & ,slh vof/k ml frfFk ls vkjEHk gksrh gS tc fMØh izorZuh; gks tkrh gS & fu"iknu ds iz;kstukFkZ fMØh ml le; izorZuh; gqbZ tc izkFkhZ us lun~ vftZr dh & tc izorZuh;rk ds lEc/k esa iz'uxr fMØh fofufnZ"V gks rks fMØh ds ikfjr djus dh frfFk dks ifjlhek ds le; ds vkjEHk gsrq ugha ekuk tk ldrkA
iqujh{k.k [kkfjt dhA ¼in l[a;k 15 o 16½
2. Brief facts of the case are that in the suit for specific performance of contract filed by respondent in the year 1982 bearing No.117/1982 the trial court decreed the suit on 05.11.1988 and decree for specific 2 performance was allowed in the following terms :
^^nkok oknh fo:) izfroknh e; [kpkZ fMØh fd;k tkrk gSA rfkk bl vej dh fMØh fof'k"V vuqikyuk dh iznku dh tkrh gS fd izfroknh oknh ds i{k esa eqrkfcd bdjkj bZ ,Dl 1 o bZ ,Dl 2 fu;ekuqlkj l{ke vf/kdkjh ls lun vUnj rhu ekg dh vof/k esa izkIr dj rFkk visf{kr cdk;k jkf'k fu;ekuqlkj lun izkIr djus ds fy, fjgschfyVs'ku fMikVZesaV ls Hkjdj lun ysdj dkxtkn eqdEey djokdj vkjkth fooknxzLr eqjCck uEcj 79 gky 74 okds pd 1 lh o Mh rglhy xaxkuxj ds fdyk uEcj 1] 2] 3] 4] 4] 5] 7 lkye ds ikap fcLok dqy 6-05 ch?kk o cS;ukek cgd eqnbZ rgjhj o rdehy djkos rFkk mä lun izkIr ,oa jftLVªh djokus ds leLr t:jh reke vej vUtke nsos tks cS;ukek cgd oknh djokus okLrs t:jh gksA ;fn izfroknh mä vkns'k dh vuqikyuk djus esa =qfV djs rks oknh dks U;k;ky; }kjk fu;ekuqlkj lun izkIr dj mä cS;ukek ds ek/;e sl vius gd esa fu"iknu djkus dk vf/kdkj gksxkA**
3. In pursuance of the above decree, the petitioner-defendant was to get the sanad within three months of the decree from the competent authority; and, thereafter, was to execute registered sale-deed of the land situated in murabba No.79 (at present No.74) of Chak 1C Bari, measuring 6.04 bigha, kila No.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, failing which, the decree holder was given liberty to get the sanad and sale-deed executed through the Court.
4. The decree was passed on 05.11.1988. Thereafter, as per the petitioner-defendant, the respondent-plaintiff kept mum for almost 18 years and preferred execution application for decree dated 05.11.1988 on 25.02.2007 along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act. The petitionerdefendant submitted detailed reply to the application filed under Section 5, Limitation Act, so also, raised objection to the maintainability of the execution proceedings before the executing Court. The executing Court, after hearing both the parties upon the application filed under Section 5, Limitation Act as well as objection raised by the petitioner-defendant, dismissed the objections and held that execution proceedings initiated by the decree-holder is well within limitation. The said order dated 16.07.2009 is under challenge in this revision petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the executing Court has committed grave error of law and, so also, jurisdictional error while treating the execution proceedings within limitation, therefore, the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner raised cogent objection that the provisions of the Limitation Act are clear that any appeal or any application other than application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be admitted after prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had satisfied the cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the law of limitation is not applicable to the execution proceedings but, still, the learned executing Court proceeded to deal with the application and registered the execution proceedings while treating the same as filing of the execution after two years of the order, therefore, the finding of the learned executing Court is perverse and it amounts to manifest injustice with the petitioner.
6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner th