The court emphasized that ignorance of a court order due to counsel's negligence does not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

ORDER :

MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J.

1.Instant revision petition has been filed by the petitioner husband challenging the order dated 29.01.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Nohar in Criminal appeal No. 15/2025 whereby, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner husband submits that the learned appellate court has committed an error of law in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay. It is submitted that the petitioner works as a labourer outside the State and he was not informed about the order by his lawyer. As soon as the petitioner came to know about the order, the petitioner filed the appeal against the judgment of trial court dated 18.07.2023. Thus, the delay caused in filing the appeal was purely bonafide, therefore, the impugned order dated 29.01.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Nohar, District Hanumangarh may be quashed and set aside.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned orders as well as material available on record.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is reproduced hereinunder for our reference:

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

A court’s principle duties are to resolve disputes between parties and achieve substantial justice. The purpose of limiting rules is not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. In accordance with widely accepted principles, Section 5 grants the courts discretion over jurisdiction. The term ”sufficient cause” is to be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice in cases where the appellant cannot be held accountable for any negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides. In the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. m. Krishnamurthy Reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that:-

“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 has observed as under:

“16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and