The court emphasized that taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act requires a prima facie case, and detailed scrutiny of evidence is inappropriate at this stage.

ORDER :

1. These three revision petitions have been filed on behalf of the petitioner, M/s Lakshmi Marketing & M/s H. Gangara, Singhi assailing the common judgment dated 30.06.2014 passed in Criminal Revision Nos.290/2013, 291/20213 & 09/2014 by the learned Sessions Judge, Bikaner, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, whereby the order taking cognizance dated 22.03.2013 passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate (NI Act) No.1, Bikaner in three separate complaint Nos.260/2013, 261/2013 & 262/2013 were quashed and set aside.

2. With the consent of learned counsel for both parties, all three matters—being factually and legally similar—were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

3. Briefly stated, the facts relevant for the adjudication of these petitions are as follows:

3.1. The petitioner, M/s Lakshmi Marketing & M/s H. Gangaram, being the complainants in all three criminal complaints, instituted a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, alleging that the accused-respondent Narayan Vyas issued cheques which were dishonoured by the bank upon presentation, with the endorsement indicating "insufficient funds" or "exceeds arrangement." Upon dishonour of the cheques, legal notices were duly issued and served upon the accused, demanding payment of the cheque amount. Despite the service of such notices and lapse of the statutory period, no payment was made by the accused, compelling the complainant to initiate proceedings under the NI Act.

3.2. The Learned Magistrate, after perusal of the complaints and supporting documents—including the dishonoured cheques, bank memos, legal notices, and postal receipts—formed a prima facie opinion that the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. Accordingly, the Magistrate took cognizance and ordered issuance of process against the accused.

3.3. These orders of cognizance were later challenged by the accused-respondents in revision before the Learned Sessions Judge, Bikaner. Vide impugned judgment dated 30.06.2014, the learned Sessions Judge allowed the revision petitions and set asided the order taking cognizance passed by the Trial Magistrate.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the impugned revisional order as well as the record of the case.

4.1. Before proceeding to analyze the legality of the revisional court’s findings, it is essential to reiterate the well-settled legal position that taking cognizance of an offence merely implies the formal application of judicial mind to the allegations made in the complaint and supporting material for the purpose of proceeding further in the matter. At this preliminary stage, the Court is not required to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, nor is it expected to undertake a detailed scrutiny of the evidence. The probative value of defence material is irrelevant at this stage and must be evaluated only at the appropriate stage of trial.

4.2 In the present case, the Learned Magistrate had perused the complaints and supporting materials annexed thereto. The documents indicated that cheques were issued by the accused- respondents, which were dishonoured for insufficient funds. Legal notices were duly issued and served, and no payment was made within the statutory time frame. These prima facie facts were sufficient to justify taking cognizance and issuing process. However, the learned Sessions Judge, while allowing the revision petitions, set aside the order taking cognizance primarily on the grounds that:

• The amount involved was substantial;

• There was no specific mention in the complaints about the exact date on which the loan or financial transaction took place;

• The circumstances under which the amou