The word "occupy" in section 14(2)(v) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 means occupation in the sense of actual user. The mere presence of furniture and willingness to pay rent does not constitute occupation.

V. P. Gupta, J.—The present revision petition has been filed by Gurbax Singh petitioner (tenant) challenging the order dated 29-3-78 passed by the District Judge, Simla, exercising the powers of the Appellate Authority under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, by which the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed with costs and the order of the Rent Controller dated 30th July, 1977 ordering his eviction from the disputed premises was upheld.

2. The brief facts of the case are that Shri Kali Dass respondent (landlord) filed an application under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act) for eviction of the petitioner from a residential set in house No. 126/1, Ladakhi Mohalla, Simla, on the grounds that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the said premises for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause and also on the ground that the premises in question is in a dilapidated condition and requires repairs.

3. This eviction application was contested by the petitioner and upon the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:—

1. Whether the notice is valid and legal. If so, its effect ? OPR

2. Whether the written statement is not proper and requires amendment as alleged ? OPA

3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to ejectment of the respondent from the premises in dispute on the grounds alleged in the petition ? OPA

4. Relief.

4. The Rent Controller, Simla, decided issue No. 1 in favour of the respondent/landlord and against the petitioner/tenant, and issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent/landlord. On issue No. 3, the Rent Controller gave a finding that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the disputed premises from 5-7-71 to 5-8-72 and as such the petitioner was liable to eviction. On the other ground that the house in question is in a dilapidated condition, the Rent Controller decided the same against the respondent/landlord. In view of the findings under the various issues, the Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant on 30th July, 1977.

5. Shri Gurbax Singh tenant/petitioner filed an appeal and the Appellate Authority also affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller and the appeal was dismissed on 29th March, 1978.

6. In this revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that both the Authorities below have not properly appreciated and understood the true meaning of the word occupy as used in section A (2) (v). It was contended by the petitioners counsel that the petitioner is in possession of the disputed premises and had been using the same and that he has never deserted the disputed premises. It was further contended that the evidence produced by the parties has not been correctly appreciated by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon 1948 (Vol. II) of All England Law Reports, page 722, {Langford Property Co., Ltd. v. Athanassoglou and another).

7. The counsel for the landlord respondent contended that there is sufficient evidence on the record to prove that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the disputed premises for a continuous period of 12 months without reasonable cause. It was further contended by him that the two Authorities below have given a concurrent finding of fact, and that this finding should not be interfered with by the High Court. In support of his contentions the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Shrimati Shakuntala Bawa v. Ram Par shad and others, 1963 PLR 103 ; Kimti Lai v Seth Nanak Chand, 1967 PLR 799 and Amar Singh and another v. Ram Rakha, 1972 PLR 492.

8. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case carefully. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have arrived at a concurrent finding of fact, that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the disputed premises for a co