The period of limitation for execution of a decree in a mortgage suit starts running from the date of preparation of the final decree, and not from the date of the preliminary decree.

V. K. Mehrotra, J.—This is a revision petition under section 115, C. P. C.

2. In Civil Suit No. 19 of 1969 instituted by one Shri Rania Ram whose heirs are the respondents in this Court except for the 7th respondent who is a proforma respondent, a preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court on November 26, 1977 in a mortgage suit against applicant Kodu Ram who is sole defendant. The decree provided that the plaintiff would be entitled to redeem the mortgaged land on deposit of a sum of Ks. 533.34 within one month of the passing of the decree. An amount of Rs. 534 was deposited by the decree-holder on December 24, 1973, that is, within the aforesaid period of one month of the passing of the preliminary decree. Thereafter, the decree-holder applied for the preparation of the final decree. An order was passed by the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala on August 7, 1976 saying that the Counsel for the respondent (defendant-judgment-debtor) did not oppose the application subject to the objection with regard to the deposit of the redemption money within limitation. The learned Judge found that the amount had been deposited within the period allowed to the decree-holder and said in his order? "......That being so the applicant-plaintiff is entitled to a final decree as prayed for. It is accordingly ordered that the final decree as prayed for be prepared and the file be consigned to the record-room after completion."

3. On March 6, 1987 the decree-holder filed an execution petition (No. 31 of 1987). the basic objections which were taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor were that the execution petition had been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation of .12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as the preliminary decree passed on November 26,1973 was the executable decree and that the decree could not be executed also for the reason that the property involved in the suit had been compulsorily acquired by the State Government for the Pong Dam and had vested in it free from any encumbrances when the State Government-took possession thereof These objections were rejected by the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala on May )1, 1991. Against that order the present revision has been filed by the judgment-debtor.

4. Order XXXIV dealing with suits relating to mortgages of immovable property provides for a preliminary decree in a redumption suit in Rule 7. Rule 8 then provides for a final decree. In its relevant part this Rule says that: "8(1) Where, before a final decree-debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the mortgaged property has been passed............the plaintiff makes payment into Court of all amounts due from him under sub-rule (1) of Rule 7, the Court shall, on application made by the plaintiff in this behalf, pass a final decree.......... And, also, if necessary— (c) ordering him to put the plaintiff in possession of the property. (2).......................... (3) ........................"

5. It is obvious that law requires the preparation of a final decree in a redumption suit in the circumstances envisaged in Order XXXIV, C. P. C.

6. The decree, which can be executed, in a suit of this nature would be the final decree. The period of twelve years envisaged in Article 136 of the Schedule (o the Limitation Act, 1963 would, in such a suit, start running from the date of the preparation of the final decree. The view of the learned Senior Sub-Judge to that effect is in consonance with law.

7. The two issues which had been framed by the learned Senior Sub-Judge, relating to the availability of the property for execution of the decree in quesion, were Issue Nos. 3 and 4 which were: "3. Whether the lands have been compulsorily acquired for Pong Dam? If so, its effect? O P. Objector.

4. Whether houses mentioned in the decree do not exist on the spot? If so, its effect? O. P. Objector."

8. Both these issues were considered together by the learned Judge. On consideration of t