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1957 Supreme(HP) 1
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
RAMABHADRAN, J.
Ram Dass
Versus
Dharam Das
Writ Petn. No. 6 of 1955
Decided On : 07-01-1957
Tek Chand and Dhian Chand, for Petitioner; K.C. Nayar and Paras Ram (for No. 2) and B Sita Ram Govt. Advocate, (for Nos. 3 and 4), for Respondents.
A person does not have a fundamental right to hold the office of Mahant, and if their appointment is found to be invalid by the civil Courts, they can be removed from office without a show cause notice.
Headnote:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARTICLE 226 - WRIT OF MANDAMUS - APPOINTMENT OF MAHANTH - POWER OF APPOINTMENT VESTED IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT - APPOINTMENT BY STATE GOVERNMENT INVALID - REMOVAL OF MAHANTH BY STATE GOVERNMENT - NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO OFFICE OF MAHANTH - NO INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - WRIT OF MANDAMUS NOT ISSUABLE.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner was appointed as Mahant of Jagannathji Temple, Nahan, by the Himachal Pradesh Government in 1950. This appointment was confirmed by the Government in October 1950. Petitioner performed his duties and managed the temple properties satisfactorily until 23-9-1955, when he was relieved of his charge by an order passed by the Collector of Sirmur district on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh Government. Sant Ramanand was appointed as interim manager, pending the appointment of a new Mahant. Dharam Das and Sant Ramanand had made a bid to oust the petitioner from his office by means of a suit for declaration and possession, which was dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Nahan, on 7-7-1954. That decision was confirmed, in appeal, by the District Judge of Sirmur on 28-6-1955. The Senior Subordinate Judge and the District Judge had made certain observations in their judgments, which went against the petitioner.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the petitioner had no fundamental right to the office of Mahant. The civil Courts had found that his appointment was ab initio invalid. Therefore, there was no question of his having been deprived of property. The Court also held that even if the order dated 21-9-1956, removing the petitioner from Mahantship, was set aside, a fresh order in similar terms could be passed against the petitioner by the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom powers of appointment (and necessarily of removal) had since been delegated by the President.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner had a fundamental right to the office of Mahant? 2. Whether the petitioner's appointment as Mahant was ab initio invalid? 3. Whether the petitioner was deprived of property by his removal from the office of Mahant? 4. Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to restore the petitioner to the office of Mahant?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the petitioner had no fundamental right to the office of Mahant. The civil Courts had found that his appointment was ab initio invalid. Therefore, there was no question of his having been deprived of property. 2. The Court held that even if the order dated 21-9-1956, removing the petitioner from Mahantship, was set aside, a fresh order in similar terms could be passed against the petitioner by the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom powers of appointment (and necessarily of removal) had since been delegated by the President.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition.
Sant Ramanand, respondent no. 2, has been appointed by respondent no. 3 as interim manager, pending the appointment of a new Mahant. Dharam Das, respondent no. 1, along with Sant Ramanand, respondent no. 2, had made a bid to oust the petitioner from his office by means of a suit for declaration and possession, which, however, was dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Nahan, on 7-7-1954. That decision was confirmed, in appeal, by the District Judge of Sirmur on 28-6-1955. While non-suiting the plaintiffs, both the Senior Subordinate Judge as well as the District Judge, Nahan, had, however, made certain observations in their judgments, which went against the petitioner.
2. Under these circumstances, the petitioner claimed that he could not be evicted by an executive order passed by respondents 3 and 4. He contended that respondents 3 and 4 had not even given him an opportunity to show cause, before he was removed from his office. The petitioner complains that his rights to property, granted by the Constitution, have been arbitrarily and summarily infringed. Hence, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein I am requested to issue a writ to respondents 3 and 4, directing them to restore the petitioner to the office of Mahant and remove the interim manager.
3. The petition has been opposed by respondents 2, 3 and 4 on various grounds. The respondents case is that the Senior Subordinate Judge, as well as the District Judge had held, on specific issues, that the appointment of the petitioner, as Mahant, was ab initio void and improper, since the power of appointment vested in the Central Government and not in the Himachal Pradesh Government. In removing the petitioner from the office of Mahant, respondents 3 and 4 only gave effect to the findings of the civil Courts.
Pending the appointment of a new Mahant, in accordance with the findings of the Courts, the Collector of Sirmur district had taken the administration of the temple under his direct supervision. It was, categorically, denied that the petitioner had any fundamental right to the office of Mahant. Consequently, there was no question of such right having been infringed. The appointment of a Mahant was within the discretion of the Central Government.
Since the appointment of the petitioner by the Himachal Pradesh Government had been found to be invalid by the civil Courts, it was considered expedient to remove him from that office. By means of a subsequent application dated 27-12-1956, on behalf of respondents 3 and 4, it was brought to the notice of this Court that in September, 1956, the President has delegated to the Lieutenant-Governor of Himachal Pradesh, powers to appoint a Mahant to the temple in question.
It was urged that the power of appointment would necessarily include the power of removal and, therefore, respondents 3 and 4 were well within their rights in removing the petitioner from his office, in pursuance to the findings of the Civil Courts. I was, therefore, requested to reject the petition.
4. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard at Nahan on the 27th ultimo. For reasons to be stated shortly, I am of the opinion that this petition cannot succeed. I shall r
