1. Mining leases declared void by State Government — Cancellation of temporary permits — Petition for writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. (Para 2 )
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1951 Supreme(SC) 64
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. Kania, CJI., M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.
The State of Orissa – Appellant
Versus
Madan Gopal Rungta – Respondent
Appeals Nos. 300 to 304 of 1951
Decided On : 25-10-1951
Advocates appeared
Shri M. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (Shri G. N. Joshi, Advocate with him), instructed by Shri P. A. Mehta, Agent - for Appellant (in all appeals) ; Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Shri H. J. Umrigar and Shri A. N. Roy, Advocates, with him), instructed by Shri S. P. Varma, Agent (in No. 300); Shri Roshan Lal, Advocate, instructed by Shri Ganpat Rai, Agent (in Nos. 301 & 304); Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Shri A. N. Roy, Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent (in No. 302); Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate, (Shri A. N. Roy, and Shri A. N. Sinha, Advocates, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent (in No. 303) - for Respondent.
Shri M. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (Shri G. N. Joshi, Advocate with him), instructed by Shri P. A. Mehta, Agent - for Appellant (in all appeals) ; Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Shri H. J. Umrigar and Shri A. N. Roy, Advocates, with him), instructed by Shri S. P. Varma, Agent (in No. 300); Shri Roshan Lal, Advocate, instructed by Shri Ganpat Rai, Agent (in Nos. 301 & 304); Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate (Shri A. N. Roy, Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent (in No. 302); Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate, (Shri A. N. Roy, and Shri A. N. Sinha, Advocates, with him), instructed by Shri P. K. Chatterjee, Agent (in No. 303) - for Respondent.
Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be used to grant interim relief as the sole and final relief to circumvent the notice requirement of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interim relief must be ancillary to a main relief based on a determined right.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 226 - Scope of jurisdiction - The issuance of writs or directions by the court is founded on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution or any other legal right has been infringed; the existence of a right is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article. (Para 5)
(B) Constitution of India - Article 226 - Interim relief - Directions in the nature of interim relief cannot be granted as the only and final relief on an application when the court expressly refrains from determining the rights of the parties. Interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief available to the party on final determination of rights in a suit or proceeding. (Para 6)
(C) Code of Civil Procedure - Section 80 - Article 226 cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief to circumvent the statutory notice requirements provided under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 6)
Facts of the case:
The respondents held mining leases granted by the ruler of a princely state prior to its merger with the Dominion of India. The State Government subsequently issued a notification declaring these leases void and later cancelled temporary permits granted to the respondents to work the mines. The respondents approached the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to withdraw the cancellation notices. The High Court, without deciding on the merits of the rights of the parties, granted interim relief to prevent the respondents from being disturbed in possession of the mines, noting that the respondents could not immediately file a civil suit due to the sixty-day notice requirement under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Findings of Court:
The order of the High Court could not be sustained as it granted interim relief as the final order of disposal without investigating or pronouncing upon the legal rights of the parties.
Issues: Whether directions in the nature of interim relief only could be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution when the Court expressly refrained from determining the rights of the parties on which a writ of mandamus or directions of a like nature could be issued.
Ratio Decidendi: The power under Article 226 is predicated on the existence of a right. Interim relief is ancillary to a main relief and cannot be used as the sole and final relief to bypass procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the court finds no other adequate remedy, it must investigate the merits to determine if a legal right was infringed before granting interim orders to maintain status quo.
Result: Appeals allowed.
Judgement Key Points
Yes, the court in this judgment supports the view that civil suit prayer and temporary injunction prayer cannot be identical to each other. This is explicitly stated in paragraph (!) , where the court emphasizes that directions in the nature of interim relief are only permissible as an aid to the main relief that could be obtained through a final decision in a civil suit. The court clarifies that when the court declines to decide on the rights of the parties and indicates that such rights should be determined in a civil suit, it cannot issue directions in the form of temporary injunctions under Art. 226 solely to facilitate the institution of that suit.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the law of annulment applied to mining leases or if the State had the right to cancel leases and permits. (Para 3 )
3. Article 226 requires the existence of a right as the foundation for jurisdiction; interim relief must be ancillary to a main relief based on determined rights. (Para 5 , 6 )
4. Article 226 cannot be used to grant interim relief as the sole and final relief to circumvent Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Para 6 )
5. Appeals allowed — High Court order set aside — Petitions dismissed. (Para 4 )
6. Can Article 226 be used solely to provide interim relief as a final order?
No. Article 226 cannot be used to grant interim relief as the only and final relief on an application. Interim relief can only be granted in aid of and as ancillary to a main relief available upon the final determination of legal rights. (Para 6 )
7. What is the necessary foundation for a High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226?
The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is founded on the court's decision that a right of the aggrieved party, whether a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution or any other legal right, has been infringed. (Para 5 )
8. Can a High Court use Article 226 to bypass the statutory notice period required under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code?
No. The court held that issuing directions in the nature of temporary injunctions under Article 226 for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code is not within the scope of the Article. (Para 6 )
Judgment
Kania, C.J.I. - These are five companion appeals form the judgement of the High Court at Orissa, delivered on five petitions filed by the respondent in each of the appeals, to obtain from the Court a writ of mandamus and / or directions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Each of the respondents alleged that between 1941 and 1947 he had agreed to take from the ruler of Keonjhar a mining lease and had entered into possession of the area. Some of the petitioners alleged that they had spent money on the development of the mines and installed machinery to work the same. It is however common ground that there was no registered lease in favour of any of the respondents before 1947. On 14th December 1947, the ruler of Keonjhar entered into a merger agreement with the Dominion of India and as from 1st January 1948 the State was merged in the Dominion of India. After singing the merger agreement , the Ruler gave registered leases on 27th December 1947 to the respondents in these appeals. In pursuance of the exercise of the powers conferred on the Government of Orissa by S. 4, Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1949, read with Notification No. 172/1B dated 23rd March 1948 of the Government of India, the Government of Orissa issued a notification dated 8th June 1949 declaring inter alia, the said leases to be void and not binding on it. This annulment was made expressly on the ground that these commitments were not reasonable and bona fide. Thereafter, the respondents, along with others approached the Orissa Government to give them leases and the State Government gave them temporary permits to work the mines in November 1949. On 3rd July 1951 however they passed an order cancelling the temporary permits and directed the respondents to remove their assets appertaining to the respective mines within a fortnight. The respondents thereupon filed the petitions before the Orissa High Court praying for writs or directions in the nature of mandamus against the State of Orissa directing them to withdraw the notices dated 8th June and 3rd July 1951 and the forbear from acting upon or giving effect to the same.
3. The Court, after noticing the rival contentions of the parties and rejecting the contention that the State of Orissa had cancelled the permits and were attempting to take possession as an act of State, posed the question,
"whether the law of annulment relied upon by the State was applicable to the mining leases granted to the petitioners, or in the alternative, whether the State had any right in law to cancel the leases before the period mentioned therein.
Referring to the contention of the State founded on the acceptance by the respondents of the temporary permits and the estoppel arising therefrom, Ray C. J. in his judgement stated as follows :
"In determining the validity of this contention (relating to the temporary permit and estoppel arising therefrom) the circumstances under which these applications were made and the legal implications of such applications and the permissions granted under them will have to be considered. It is remote from our intention to express any opinion in this summary proceeding as to the respective merits of the rival contentions. I am however satisfied that in the context of events and in the logle of circumstances attending thereto, there is a case to be tried."
He next considered the scope of the writ of mandamus and came to the conclusion that "at the moment" the respondents had no alternative legal remedy, equally convenient, beneficial and effectual because the respondents could not file a suit till after the expiry of the period of sixty days required for the purpose under S. 80, Civil P. C., and he thought that unless protected by the Court in the meanwhile the respondents would undergo irreparable and irremediable loss of possession of the mining leases involving a huge waste of labout, machinery and other resources of equipments of immense value hardly capable of being remedied by
