The main legal point established in the judgment is that the courts have the power to quash criminal proceedings to meet the ends of justice, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes where parties have settled amicably and without pressure.

RAJIV SHARMA, J.

1. Marriage between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 19.11.2011. Respondent No. 2 lodged FIR against the petitioners bearing registration No. 223 of 2012 on 30.11.2012 for offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Respondent No. 2 has also filed a complaint under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla. The complaint under section 12 of the Act was allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla and petitioner No. 1 was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in the court besides Rs. 7,500/- per month as maintenance and Rs. 2,500/- per month as rental of the house to be taken by respondent No. 2. Petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla. Proceedings arising out of FIR No. 223 of 2012 are pending before the trial court since 5.9.2013. The evidence till date has not been recorded.

2. The parties have arrived at a compromise whereby a sum of Rs. Five lakhs was to be paid to respondent No. 2 by the petitioners. A sum of Rs. Three lakhs has already been paid to respondent No. 2 by the petitioners. The balance amount of Rs. Two lakhs is to be paid when the final order is rendered in the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 223 of 2012 as well as appeal filed under section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. A sum of Rs. 50,000/- has also been paid as maintenance towards settlement between the parties.

3. Since now the parties have arrived at amicable settlement without any pressure, continuation of the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 223 of 2012 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the appeal under section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla would be futile exercise and will misuse of process of law.

4. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:-

(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

(15) In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

5. Their Lordships of t