The main legal principle established in the judgment is that the interest of justice can be served by quashing criminal proceedings when the parties have compromised the matter, even in non-compoundable offences pertaining to matrimonial disputes.

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R. No. 65/18, dated 18.3.2018, under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Hamirpur, H.P. pending before the learned Court below.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 18.3.2018, respondent No. 2-Nisha Devi, had lodged FIR against the petitioner-accused, whereby son of respondent No. 3, had sustained injuries, when son of respondent No. 3, was standing near vehicle bearing No. HP- 01D-4495, motorcycle bearing No. HP-22B-6953, which was being driven by the accused-petitioner hit the son of respondent No. 3, as a result of which, he sustained injuries on his left leg and arm. Thereafter, the complainant took him for medical treatment at Civil Hospital, Tauni Devi and opined that he has suffered simple injuries in his left leg. The complainant narrated the whole incident to the police, on the basis of which, FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-2) and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. Mr. Pankaj Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3, has argued that respondent No. 3-Joginder Singh, Power of Attorney of Smt. Nisha Devi, father of the victim has stated that victim has received minor injury and now, the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter