IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Suresh Kumar – Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and Others – Respondents
Cr. MMO No. 216 of 2018
Decided On : 01-06-2018
Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Indian Penal code, Motor Vehicles Act - 279, 337, 185, 196
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner seeks to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings arising from a road accident where the parties have entered into a compromise. The respondent argues that the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way is an offence against society and cannot be compounded.
Finding of the Court:
The court, considering the compromise between the parties and the interest of justice, exercises powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings.
Issues: Whether the compromise between the parties justifies quashing the proceedings and if the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way can be compounded.
Ratio Decidendi: The court can quash criminal proceedings if it is necessary to secure the ends of justice, even if the offence is non-compoundable. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth, punish the guilty, and protect the innocent. The court should encourage genuine settlements of disputes, particularly in matrimonial matters.
Final Decision: The court quashes the FIR and consequent proceedings, considering the compromise between the parties and the interest of justice.
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No. 35, dated 24.02.2016, under Sections 279 & 337 of the Indian Penal code and Sections 185 & 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bilaspur, H.P.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 24.02.2016, respondent No. 2 after loading his truck, bearing registration No. HP-23A-7213 from ACC Barmana was going to Nalagarh. At about 3.30 p.m. when he reached near Sungal, a motorcycle, being driven by the petitioner, hit with the truck, due to which, the petitioner and respondent No. 3 sustained injuries. As per respondent No. 2, the petitioner was driving the motorcycle in rash and negligent driving and he was under the influence of liquor. Accordingly, FIR, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 185 & 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act was registered against the petitioner. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-2) and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned Court below may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way is offence against the society and it cannot be compounded/quashed on the basis of settlement between the offender and victim, so the present petition may be dismissed.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.
(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such
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