The main legal point established in the judgment is that the High Court has wide and unfettered inherent powers to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice, and it can quash criminal proceedings based on a compromise between the parties, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes.

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No. 55/2011, dated 14.4.2011, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P, pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadaun, District Hamirpur, in Case No. 60-1/2011, 30-II/2014, titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Jarnail Singh.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 14.4.2011, respondent No.2-complainant alongwith his son, namely, Udit Verma, were present in their shop. At about 4:20 PM, respondent No.2-complainant and his son Udit Verma-respondent No.3, were on the way, on National Highway-88, while they were going by the side of Beas bridge, which was adjacent to Trimurti Market, a scooter bearing No.HP-21-1449, came from Nadaun bus stand, which hit the complainant’s son Udit Verma-respondent No.3, who fell down on the road and received injuries on his head. This accident has taken place due to the rashness and negligence driving of the petitioner-accused. The complainant narrated the whole incident to the police, on the basis of which, FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide written Compromise dated 12.5.2018 (Annexure P-3) and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-3), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. Mr. Kedar Singh Jindal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.2 and 3 has argued that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, howe