The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's power under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings in order to secure the ends of justice, especially in cases where the parties have reached a genuine settlement.

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No. 22, dated 05.02.2017, under Sections 279, 337 & 338 of the Indian Penal code, registered at Police Station, Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, H.P., along with all consequential proceedings pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, H.P., in case No. 24-II/2017 against petitioner No. 1, which is fixed for 03.08.2018.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 05.02.2017, petitioner No. 2/complainant (hereinafter to be called as “the complainant”) along with her husband and ten years daughter was going to Bassi Market in a motorcycle, at about 05.30 p.m. when they reached near Bhakreri, a motorcycle coming from Bassi side in a high speed, hit them, due to which they sustained injuries. As per the complainant, the offending motorcycle was being driven by petitioner No. 1 in rash and negligent manner. Accordingly, FIR, under Sections 279, 337 & 338 was registered against petitioner No. 1. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-1) and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-1), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against petitioner No. 1 and the FIR/Challan pending before the learned Court below may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way is offence against the society and it cannot be compounded/quashed on the basis of settlement between the offender and victim, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash